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SHOULD SHAREHOLDERS BE REWARDED 
FOR LOYALTY? EUROPEAN EXPERIMENTS 
ON THE WEDGE BETWEEN TENURED
VOTING AND TAKEOVER LAW
by Chiara Mosca*
ABSTRACT
Corporate law reveals its democratic background when it comes to the 
general meetings of shareholders, finding, on both sides of the Atlantic, its 
most tangible expression in the “one share, one vote” principle. While, in the 
political landscape, the “one person, one vote” standard is absolute dogma 
and weighting votes according to people’s preferences and interests has never 
proved feasible, in the corporate scenario the one share, one vote principle is 
constantly challenged by the incentives of companies and their shareholders to 
shape corporate rights according to specific needs. In this respect, some 
legislators (specifically in France and Italy) have provided mechanisms that 
allow more loyal shareholders to increase their voting power. Tenured voting 
(or time-phased voting rights) should be analyzed in light of the modern 
corporate governance debate, which calls for a stronger role for long-term 
investors. However, the other side of the coin should be considered: the 
increase in voting rights broadens the range of control-enhancing 
mechanisms, although specific sunset clauses (whether provided for by law or 
voluntarily opted in by companies) may restore the one share, one vote rule. 
The analysis suggests that the mechanism based on tenured voting is more 
transparent and potentially less stable than other common control-enhancing 
mechanisms and deserves to be considered in the debate. At the EU level, the 
possibility left to the Member States of weighting shareholders’ voting power 
according to their long-term interests, leads to legislative fragmentation 
across Europe. Specifically, in Italy, the adoption of tenured voting coupled 
with a tradition of ownership concentration sharply empowers controlling 
shareholders. At the same time, European takeover regulation plays an 
exogenous role in indirectly selecting the companies that adopt time-phased 
voting rights. The final result is completely mistrusted, as tenured voting rights 
disappoint their expectations and are rarely used to meet a true need of long 
termism. The paper describes the paradox that emerges when tenured voting 
rights interact with the core principles of the EU financial market law system, 
and it offers various ways to alleviate this difficult coexistence.
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I. LOYAL SHAREHOLDERS AND LONG-TERMISM
A. Introduction
In the financial literature developed after the financial crisis of 2007–2009, 
loyal shareholders emerged as a possible instrument to mitigate the growing 
tendency toward short-termism by company directors. In the most pessimistic 
view, management decisions influenced by a short horizon were considered 
highly destructive, due to the excessive focus by directors of publicly-listed 
companies on quarterly earnings and share prices as performance benchmarks. 
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It is widely recognized that while stock markets place short-term pressure on 
corporate executives, firms should not neglect investment opportunities, innova-
tion, and long-term planning.1
Excessive attention on short-term goals (i.e. short-termism) is unrelated to 
how efficiently companies are governed.2 Efficient corporate governance is 
consistent with positive short-term results, especially if directors respond to the 
short-term attitude of shareholders themselves. Conversely, loyal shareholders 
are shareholders who are more concerned with the firm’s long-term fundamen-
tal value than with share prices. It is often assumed that loyal shareholders are 
“buy-and-hold” investors who generally—but not necessarily—engage with the 
management of the company. Their loyalty therefore corresponds to their plan 
to hold shares for a prolonged period of time, even if market prices deviate from 
the firm’s long-term fundamental value.
If we consider shareholders’ investment duration the most immediate meas-
ure of their loyalty, two mechanisms may reinforce the tendency of sharehold-
ers to maintain their shares longer. The first involves a financial advantage for 
loyal shareholders. The second leverages the extra power that can be granted to 
shareholders in terms of increased voting rights. Although in theory a wide 
range of solutions is available, and the two loyalty privileges can be combined 
in the same financial instrument, their different natures suggest separate anal-
yses.
In this regard, the array of financial benefits for loyal shareholders can be 
structured in several ways, such as equity warrants or loyalty shares (the latter, 
in this context, meaning shares allotted as a benefit to long-term investors), or a 
richer distribution of dividends. Increased dividends, in particular, are neutral 
from the companies’ capital structure viewpoint; they involve the inclusion in 
the company’s articles of association of an opt-in clause for a surplus in the dis-
tribution of dividends to shareholders who maintain their shares for a defined 
period.3 However, despite being adopted by various jurisdictions—in France in 
1994 and Italy in 2010—companies have rarely used this dividend majoré. Be-
yond the many ambiguities in the country-specific provisions, especially with 
regard to the conditions that shareholders must fulfill to receive additional divi-
dends,4 its low overall adoption5 seems to indicate that long-termism cannot be 
1. See Patrick Bolton & Frédéric Samama, Loyalty-Shares: Rewarding Long-Term Inves-
tors, 25 J. APP. CORP. FIN., 38, 40 (2013); P. Alexander Quinby, Addressing Corporate Short-
Termism Through Loyalty Shares, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389, 396 (2013); Mark J. Roe, Corporate 
Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 Bus. Law. 977, 979 (2013).
2. See Bolton & Samama, supra note 1, at 38.
3. See, e.g., M.L. Lennarts & M.S. Koppert-van Breek, Loyalty Dividend and the EC Prin-
ciple of Equal Treatment of Shareholders, 5 EUR. COMPANY L. 173, 174 (2008).
4. According to Art.127-quater of the Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58, in G.U. 
26 marzo 1998, n.71 and subsequent amendments (also known as Testo Unico della Finan-
za)(hereinafter the “Consolidated Law on Finance”), only ‘minority’ shareholders—namely, those 
who cannot exercise any significant influence over the company’s management (a situation that is 
not always easy to ascertain)—and shareholders who do not confer their shares to a shareholders’
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easily achieved by promising a long-term financial advantage when short-term 
trading opportunities are much more attractive to investors.6
The article will focus on the second loyalty incentive—an additional privi-
lege to increase the voting power of long-term shareholders. The freedom of 
companies to implement this mechanism varies widely from one legal system to 
another, due to different approaches to dual-class shares that entitle sharehold-
ers to exercise multiple voting rights. Companies’ ability to offer this incentive 
also depends on the extent to which national jurisdictions allow deviations from 
the “one share, one vote” principle. The economic literature has traditionally 
mistrusted any excessive disproportion of cash flows and control rights that ex-
acerbates the incentives for controlling shareholders to extract private benefits 
from the company, to the detriment of other shareholders.7
Tenured voting rights—in particular, those that give the owner the right to 
mature time-phased voting rights—belong to this strand of reasoning, and their 
specific characteristics will ground this discussion. They reward shareholders 
with increased voting rights if they continuously hold their shares for a defined 
period.
In several jurisdictions, time-phased voting rights are not fantasy. Under US
state law they are generally considered permissible if they are spelled out in 
companies’ charters, and despite the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
traditional resistance toward multiple-voting structures, tenured voting is a re-
ality for some public companies.8 For non-public companies and companies 
about to go public, multiple voting securities and tenured voting are viable tools 
in the United States, but the NYSE prohibits listed companies from adopting 
these mechanisms once the company has issued stock with a certain package of 
voting rights. That said, the NYSE has allowed some exceptions that may im-
agreement—are entitled to receive additional loyalty dividends, corresponding to a 10% surplus if 
they retain their shares for a period of not less than one year, when the articles of association so 
provide. Moreover, the shares that can be entitled to the loyalty dividend cannot exceed 0.5% of the 
share capital for the shareholder entitled to the extra dividend. This limitation, which is provided 
also by Art. L. 232-14 of the French Code de Commerce, reflects the lawmaker’s concern for a too-
extensive derogation of the equality principle of shareholders, but it also implies a potential reverse 
effect on long-termism, since shareholders may decide to disinvest their holding exceeding the 0.5% 
that cannot receive the increased dividends (Richard Routier, Primes de fidélité: le revers de la mé-
daille?, Bulletin Joly Sociétés1996, 23 § 3 and § 15).
5. Jeroen Delvoie & Carl Clottens, Accountability and Short-Termism: Some Notes on 
Loyalty Shares, 9 LAW & FIN. MARKETS REV. L., 19, 20 (2005); see generally Mario Stella Richter 
Jr., I Troppi Problemi del Dividendo Maggiorato, RIVISTA DEL DIRITTO COMMERCIALE E DEL 
GENERALE DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI, I 89 (2011) (It.).
6. See Lennarts & Koppert-van Breek, supra note 3, at 175, 179.
7. Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating 
the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1648 (2006).
8. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, Dual-Class Stock, www.cii.org/dualclass_stock 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2019); see also Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and 
Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 548, 552 (2016).
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pact stockholder voting rights if it finds that such actions have a “reasonable 
business justification.”9
Italy and France have adopted tenured voting rights at the legislative level 
as regulatory tools to invite listed companies to find a contractual solution in the 
search for long-termism. Unlike the United States, where there is no limit to the 
time-weighing multiplier of the increase in voting rights, legislative reforms in 
Europe, including the recent review of Belgian company law (see infra Part 
I(5)), reward loyal shareholders of listed companies with no more than double 
voting rights. This privilege does not require any alteration in the capital struc-
ture of the company and takes the form of an individual advantage granted to 
long-term shareholders.
The focus on long-termism, as the ultimate goal pursued in both Italy and 
France, should not overshadow the fact that tenured voting rights represent con-
trol-enhancing mechanisms (CEMs). Like dual-class shares, these mechanisms 
grant extra voting power to the controlling shareholder. However, unlike from 
dual-class shares, the increase in voting rights dissolves if corporate control 
changes. Loyalty, in other words, is still a personal characteristic of the share-
holder, and the voting rights that have increased accordingly cannot be passed 
on to less loyal third parties.
The analysis of this loyalty-enhancing tool is divided into three parts. Part I 
describes the legislative choices made in Italy, France, and Belgium, and elabo-
rates the theoretical debate on the pros and cons of time-phased voting rights. 
Part II provides evidence in the form of empirical analysis. It helps to classify 
the Italian listed companies that have adopted a provision allowing long-term 
shareholders to obtain additional voting rights, and to verify the distribution of 
ownership and voting rights after maturity. The empirical exercise analyzed di-
rectors’ pre-general meeting proposals, the articles of association of Italian 
companies, and the publicly available sections of the companies’ registers in 
which tenured voting rights are recorded. It identifies common traits in the deci-
sion-making process to adopt tenured voting rights, and the typology of share-
holders who welcomed the introduction of this loyalty-enhancing mechanism. 
Part III highlights the interference between this loyalty-enhancing mechanism 
and takeover law. The mandatory offer—a special feature of European law that 
9. See Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 789, 833 (2014). On the historical reconstruction of the SEC’s failed attempt to render a 
multiple-voting structure unsuitable for publicly traded companies; see generally Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 565 (1991); Da-
vid J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron Benjamin, Tenure Voting and the US Public 
Company, 72 BUS. LAW. 295, 304 (2017); Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-
Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L. J. 1554, 1572 (2015); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One 
Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 
481 (2008); Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 849, 903 (2012); Paul H. Edelman, Wei Jiang & Randall S. Thomas, Will Tenure Voting Give 
Corporate Managers Lifetime Tenure? 1, 11 (January 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (ECGI 
Law Working Paper No. 348/2018, available at ssrn.com/abstract=3107225).
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has no equivalent in the United States—operates as an exogenous constraint that 
represents the only concrete hindrance to disproportionate cash flows and vot-
ing rights. The current choice made by Italy to extend the existing mandatory 
offer rule to tenured voting is inconsistent with the premise that loyalty voting 
rights should increase shareholders’ participation in the life of the company. 
The conclusion will draw attention to the urgent need to rethink the relationship 
between takeover law and tenured voting, moving toward less fragmentation 
across Europe. More reflection is needed at the European level, on specific rules 
applicable when, within the framework of the Takeover Directive,10 the reaction 
to a large increase in voting rights is in the mandatory offer obligation.
B. How Tenured Voting Impacts the Principles of Equal Treatment of 
Shareholders and “One Share, One Vote”
Although it is a dominant principle in several jurisdictions, one share, one 
vote is not an entrenched rule. Not only are various approaches available for 
companies to alter the relationship between ownership and control (such as pyr-
amid structures, cross-shareholdings, shareholders’ agreements, and voting-
right ceilings), but in many European Union Member States (Member States) 
different classes of shares are permitted, thus allowing companies to issue 
shares with limited or no voting rights.11
It is therefore surprising that, even where dual-class shares have historically 
been used, there has been much more discussion on the limits and the eligibility 
of shares with multiple voting rights. A possible explanation for this strong op-
position lies in the observation—which seems to be contrary to any form of 
shareholder democracy12—that multiple voting rights shift the decision-making 
power within the (voting) shareholder group to a restricted fraction of powerful 
shareholders.
Quite often multiple voting securities are tightly linked to maintaining con-
trol by reducing the equity invested in the company. Agency costs, normally 
borne by shareholders to monitor managers, are amplified by the fact that plac-
ing multiple voting shares in the hands of a few powerful shareholders reduces 
transparency and increases the complexity of the principal-agent relationship. 
10. Directive 2004/25 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
takeover bids, [hereinafter the Directive on Takeover Bids or Takeover Directive].
11. The complete array of control-enhancing mechanisms is listed in the internal study 
commissioned by the European Commission, ‘Report on the Proportionality Principle in the Euro-
pean Union’, (2006), https://ecgi.global/content/one-share-one-vote-2007; Simone Alvaro, Angela 
Ciavarella, Doina D’Eramo & Nadia Linciano, LA DEVIAZIONE DAL PRINCIPIO “UN’AZIONE-UN 
VOTO” E LE AZIONI A VOTO MULTIPLO. Quaderni giuridici, 30, 47 (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.consob.it/documents/11973/201676/qg5.pdf/a6a131f4-c307-404f-882d-e3dc1ab86c28.
12. See Arman Khachaturyan, Trapped in Delusion: Democracy, Fairness and the One-
Share-One-Vote Rule in the European Union, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV., 335, 337 (2007); see also 
David L. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporation: Critical Reflections on the Rule of 
“One Share, One Vote”, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 (1970).
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Minority shareholders have fewer instruments and bear a greater cost in moni-
toring those controlling shareholders who act as managers’ allies.13 Moreover, 
the ideal separation between active shareholders, who opt for high-voting 
shares, and passive ones, who settle for low-voting shares, is always highly the-
oretical, and does not reflect the real choices of investors.14
This last concern apparently dissolves when loyalty-enhancing mechanisms, 
as adopted in Italy and France, are considered. The reference to such instru-
ments as “loyalty shares,” despite its common use, is misleading. It is not nec-
essary to issue a new class of shares; rather, all shareholders are equally granted 
as double voting rights as a premium for their long-term entitlement, irrespec-
tive of the number of shares those shareholders own. Any gain of voting right is 
therefore entirely forward-looking. Shareholders start with the “standard set” of 
rights, as spelled out in the company’s articles of association, and only those 
who hold their shares for the period of maturity (or “loyalty period”) are subject 
to an initial registration with double rights. Since these rights are not cemented 
into a specific class of securities,15 it is preferable to refer to “tenured voting,”
or “time-phased voting,” instead of “loyalty shares.”
The potential availability of the loyalty reward to all shareholders should 
prevent any violation of the principle of equal treatment.16 The principle laid 
out in Article 42 of the Second Council Directive17 only requires that share-
holders in equal circumstances be treated equally. The legislative reform in Ita-
ly allows companies to opt in for a reward mechanism that ultimately renders all 
shareholders eligible for bonus voting rights; conversely, in France listed com-
panies can opt out of the default provision that enables all shareholders to ma-
ture similar bonus rights.18 Hence, all shareholders who have held stock for the 
same amount of time are treated the same, the duration of individual share own-
13. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1651; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of 
Corporate Governance Research, 23 REV. FIN. ST. 939, 948 (2010); John Armour, Henry Hans-
mann & Reiner Kraakman, ‘Agency Problems and Legal Strategies’, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW (Kraakman et al. eds.) 36, (2ed. 2009).
14. See Rock, supra note 9, at 901.
15. 2 MICHEL GERMAIN & VERONIQUE MAGNIER, Les sociétés commerciales, in TRAITE DE 
DROIT DES AFFAIRES 377 (21st ed. 2014). In France, however, after the maturity of double voting 
rights, the related shares are sometimes considered a separate class of shares. See Charles Goyet, 
Nicolas Rontchevsky & Michel Storck, L’impact de la loi Florange sur le droit des offres publiques 
d’acquisition et les sociétés cotées françaises, REVUE TRIMESTRELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL ET DE 
DROIT ECONOMIQUE 363, 367 (2014).
16. Cf. Berger et al., supra note 9, at 309, 311; Marco Lamandini, Voto plurimo, tutela delle 
minoranze e offerte pubbliche di acquisto, GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE, 491, 504-05 (2015).
17. The Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976, 1976 O.J. (L 26/1) has 
been repealed by Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Octo-
ber 2012. See 2012 O.J. (L 315/74) (referring to the principle of equal treatment in Art. 46), recently 
replaced by the codification made by the Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 14 June 2017. See 2017 O.J. (L 169/46) (discussing certain aspects of company 
law and referring to “Equal treatment of all shareholders who are in the same position” in Art. 85).
18. GERMAIN & MAGNIER, supra note 15, at 377.
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ership justifies unequal treatment in light of the decision to pursue long-termism 
as a specific company’s interest.19
A different conclusion should be reached regarding the principle of one 
share, one vote. In the hypothetical situation in which all companies’ sharehold-
ers maintain their investment for the loyalty period, all of them will be rewarded 
with double voting rights and thus tenured voting will have no effect on the dis-
tribution of power within the company. This scenario is unrealistic. Listed com-
panies always need a liquid market for their securities, which are traded daily. 
This need makes it impossible for all shareholders to mature extra voting rights 
at the same time. The loyalty-enhancing mechanism should therefore be consid-
ered as a deviation from the principle of one share, one vote. Because of the po-
tential on-going variability of the total voting rights of companies that have opt-
ed for these provisions, the concrete effect of the divergence in decision-making 
power and cash flows varies.20
In the European scenario, Italy and France have gone well beyond what was 
foreseen by the initiatives at the EU level. Belgium is following a similar path.
Official documents date the Commission’s interest in enhancing shareholder 
long-termism back to 2011, when the Reflection Group on the Future of EU 
Company Law recommended a clear framework for companies wishing to pro-
vide for preferential treatment for long-term shareholders that expressly consid-
ered increased voting rights or dividends. However, the documents that fol-
lowed,21 including the 2015 Shareholder Rights Directive, never met such 
expectations and, in line with the conclusion reached in the literature,22 loyalty 
shares or similar loyalty-enhancing mechanisms have been left to Member 
States or companies themselves.
C. Tenured Voting in Italy
In Italy, where the ownership structure is traditionally concentrated, shares 
with limited voting rights have been historically allowed (within the limit of no 
more than half of the corporate capital), while shares with multiple voting rights 
were banned by a provision that specifically required that each share bear no 
more than one vote. This taboo suddenly disappeared in 2014 when Italy radi-
19. See Andrea Sacco Ginevri, The Rise of Long-Term Minority Shareholders’ Rights in 
Publicly Held Corporations and its Effect on Corporate Governance, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.
587, 591, 615 (2011).
20. See infra Part III(3).
21. Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance – a Modern Legal 
Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, COM (2012) 740 final 
(Dec. 12, 2012); Commission Green Paper on Long-Term Financing of the European Economy,
COM (2013) 150 final (Mar. 25, 2013;by the Directive (EU) 2017/828, of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 17 May 2017 Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the Encouragement 
of Long-Term Shareholder Engagement (hereinafter Shareholder Rights Directive II).
22. See Delvoie, Clottens, supra note 5, at 24.
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cally changed its approach toward multiple voting shares23 as an immediate po-
litical reaction to the migration of Chrysler-Fiat from Italy to the Netherlands. 
The company cited the availability of multiple voting shares in the Netherlands 
as one of the key factors behind the decision.
The Italian Government invoked regulatory competition to avoid a trend of 
Italian companies moving abroad. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the national 
adoption of multiple voting rights will also serve to attract foreign companies to 
reincorporate in Italy. Significant barriers still exist in Europe that minimize 
regulatory competition among jurisdictions and stock exchanges.24
Despite the friction with the traditional adherence to the one share, one vote 
principle, the need to participate in this regulatory competition25 led to the un-
expected withdrawal of the prohibition on issuing shares with more than one 
voting right, leaving room for the adoption of a twofold approach to multiple 
voting securities in unlisted and listed companies. Unlisted companies are now 
allowed to issue a specific class of shares that grants the owner the right to up to 
three voting rights (and to maintain those shares in case of listing), while time-
phased voting rights have been specifically designed for companies whose secu-
rities are listed on a regulated market. Coexistence of the two mechanisms in 
listed companies is never permitted.26
The additional voting rights, granted as a premium for shareholder loyalty, 
are subject to a compulsory sunset clause that provides for their dissolution after 
the sale or donation of the underlying securities. Tenured voting rights always 
dissolve when the underlying shares are directly transferred within the group.27
Italian law contains a strict provision, absent in French law, that nullifies addi-
tional voting rights in case of an indirect change in control of a shareholder who 
is entitled of double voting rights over a relevant threshold.28
Conversely, the transfer of shares in the event of succession is excluded 
from this clause (so tenured voting rights are transmissible to the descendants of 
23. See Marco Ventoruzzo, The Disappearing Taboo of Multiple Voting Shares: Regulatory 
Responses to the Migration of Chrysler-Fiat 1–17 (European Corp. Gov’t Inst. Working Paper No. 
288, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2574236.
24. Augusto Santoro, Ciro Di Palma, Paolo Guarneri & Alessandro Capogrosso, Deviation 
from the “one share—one vote” principle in Italy: recent developments—multiple voting rights 
shares and loyalty shares, BOCCONI LEGAL PAPERS 141, 142 (2015); Delvoie & Clottens, supra 
note 5, at 19; for the historical perspective on multiple voting shares in Italy: Giulio Sandrelli e 
Marco Ventoruzzo, Classes of shares and voting rights in the history of Italian corporate law, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW, Cheltenham-
Northampton, (2018), 269–97, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2875724.
25. Piergaetano Marchetti, Osservazioni e materiali sul voto maggiorato, RIVISTA DELLE
SOCIETÀ 448, 449 (2015); Ventoruzzo, supra note 24.
26. Consolidated Law on Finance, supra note 4, at Art. 127-sexies(2)(3).
27. Marchetti, supra note 25, at 456.
28. Consolidated Law on Finance, supra note 4, at Art. 127-quinquies(3). Relevant thresh-
olds correspond to the percentage of shares stipulated for mandatory ownership disclosure, that cur-
rently corresponds to 3-5% if the company is a small or medium enterprise (SME) (infra note 111)).
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loyal shareholders) unless the company voluntarily opts in. This exception—
which, by default, allows the heirs of the company’s founder to keep the extra 
voting rights—represents a missed opportunity for Italian legislators. A better 
solution would have been to exploit the main benefit of tenured voting rights—
granting stability to the visionary founder and the company’s management, par-
ticularly after the initial public offering (IPO),29 leaving shares with single vot-
ing rights in the hands of her successors. One may argue that the possibility of 
registering inherited shares to restart the maturity period would lead to the same 
shareholder power distribution in the long run. On a deeper level, however, the 
preservation of double voting rights protects against an incursion of the manda-
tory offer obligation if the relevant threshold is newly raised at the maturity 
date.30
In this respect, the introduction of tenured voting has required significant 
amendments to the national rules on the mandatory offer obligation. Within the 
framework of the Takeover Directive and consistent with the system of thresh-
olds triggering the mandatory offer, tenured voting rights should be counted, 
like any newly acquired shares, in the overall power available to the shareholder 
(or group of shareholders acting in concert) that incurs in the takeover obliga-
tion. Such a conclusion may seem revolutionary since, in the absence of any 
payment of a premium for corporate control and any impact on the number of 
tradable shares on the market, the maturity of increased voting rights may trig-
ger the obligation to launch a public offer. A substantially similar approach has 
likewise been adopted in France.
D. The Loi Florange in France
The traditional French approach to double voting rights is somewhat cryp-
tic. Multiple voting securities were banned in 193031 to reduce their use as a de-
fense against hostile takeovers, thus subjecting national companies and their 
management to the monitoring effects of the market for corporate control. 
Shortly after, however, Article L. 225-123 of the Code de Commerce was 
amended to allow both listed and unlisted companies to reward certain share-
holders with double voting rights.32 At this early stage, a protectionist approach 
prevailed, and tenured voting rights were only granted to shareholders of French 
29. Berger, Davidoff Solomon, & Benjamin, supra note 9, at 303; Santoro, Di Palma, 
Guarneri & Capogrosso, supra note 24, at 142, 148.
30. See infra Part III.
31. GERMAIN & MAGNIER, supra note 15, at 374 (explaining, more precisely, that the law of 
26 April 1930 prohibited French companies from issuing new multiple voting securities while the 
law of 13 November 1993 suppressed existing multiple voting rights securities).
32. The law of 13 November 1933 provided that investors who have held their shares for at 
least two years can be given a double voting right: GERMAIN & MAGNIER, supra note 15, at 375; 
Pierre-Henry Conac, The New French Preferred Shares: Moving Towards a More Liberal Ap-
proach, 2 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 487, 498 (2005).
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nationality.33 This right was granted to shareholders identified in a company’s 
register for a continuous period of at least two years; it appears French legisla-
tion may have inspired similar legislation in Italy.
The literature reports that until early 2014, of the 104 largest French com-
panies by market capitalization listed in the SBF120 Index, the majority of them 
(57 percent) used the loyalty double voting system; moreover, among newly 
listed companies, the use of tenured voting rights was widespread, due to the 
possibility to retroactively consider the holding period prior to the IPO.34
While Italy aligned its tenured voting rights with the long-standing French 
voting regulations, France was implementing a fundamental revolution to the 
described mechanism. On March 29, 2014, the French Government promulgat-
ed the Loi Florange,35 which reversed the way increased voting rights are as-
signed to loyal shareholders of listed companies.36 This statute provides that, 
starting from April 3, 2014, all shares may potentially increase voting rights af-
ter a period of at least two years of uninterrupted ownership,37 unless two-thirds 
of the company’s stockholders vote to opt out. In other words, in France, ten-
ured voting rights have become the default rule (attributed to investors who reg-
istered their shares as a condition of mature additional rights), and listed com-
panies that want to adhere to the one share, one vote principle need to opt out of 
this default loyalty-enhancing mechanism.38 At the same time, the Loi Florange
has removed the nationality requirement that previously allowed only French 
shareholders to be rewarded with double voting rights.
On March 29, 2014, before the Loi Florange entered into force, the articles 
of association of forty-five companies within the aforementioned sample of 104 
French companies did not contain the tenured voting rights clause. The share-
holders in thirty-one of those forty-five companies approved the proposals to 
opt out of the new default rule, confirming their preference for the one share, 
one vote rule. The remaining fourteen companies then inevitably switched to 
the new default system. In seven of those cases, a blocking minority did not al-
33. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L225-123, para. 3 (2000) 
(Fr.).
34. See Marco Becht, Yuliya Kamisarenka & Anete Pajuste, Loyalty Shares with Tenure 
Voting—A Coasian Bargain? Evidence from the Loi Florange Experiment (ECGI Law Working 
Paper No. 398/2018, Apr. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3166494; see 
also Yu-Hsin Lin, Controlling Controlling-Minority Shareholders: Corporate Governance and 
Leveraged Corporate Control, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453, 469 (2017) (providing empirical 
evidence from 2015 after the adoption of the Loi Florange).
35. Loi 2014-384 du 29 mars 2014 visant à reconquérir l’économie réelle [Law 2014-384 on 
Reclaiming the Real Economy March 29, 2014], (Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Apr. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Loi Florange].
36. Paul Le Cannu & Bruno Dondero, DROIT DES SOCIETES 625 (Paul Le Cannu & Bruno 
Dondero eds., 6th ed. 2015).
37. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L225-123 (Fr.).
38. Maurice Cozian, Alain Viandier & Florence Deboissy, Le Droit De Vote, 30 DROIT DES 
SOCIETES 411, 413 (2017).
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low the shareholders’ general meeting to revert to the one share, one vote rule; 
in the other seven companies, the directors simply refrained from calling the 
shareholders’ meeting, aware that the necessary two-thirds majority was not at-
tainable.39
French political interference also played a role in the outcome of the tenured 
voting rights legislation by contending that these loyalty-enhancing mechanisms 
could protect national enterprises against hostile acquisitions of corporate con-
trol.40 In line with this goal, in 2015 the French Government increased its 15 
percent stake in Renault by an additional 4.5 percent, to prevent shareholders 
from opting out of the default rule that rewarded loyal shareholders with double 
voting rights.41 The Government also increased its holding in Air France-KLM 
to 17.6 percent in order to foil a one share, one vote proposal.42
Bonus voting rights lapse in the event of share transfers, and any provision 
to the contrary is null or void.43 However, these rights do not dissolve in cases 
of merger or demerger of the shareholder entitled to double voting, nor in cases 
of inheritance or donation to certain family members.44 While the maturity in-
terval is fixed in most cases at two years, it sometimes varies in length, in one 
case for ten years.45 These provisions have been replicated in Italy.
With regard to the mandatory offer, the French approach is similar to the 
Italian: since tenured voting rights could be used to achieve or consolidate cor-
porate control, such rights are included in the triggering threshold of the manda-
tory offer. Beyond this general rule, the Loi Florange, fine-tuned by the Loi 
Macron,46 has waived the obligation to announce a mandatory offer, applicable 
when the increase in voting rights is offset by a decrease in the overall amount 
of the underlying shares held.47 Specifically, shareholders who on April 2, 2014 
owned an interest greater than 30 percent of the share capital or voting rights 
are exempted from the mandatory offer obligation if they exceed the relevant 
39. Becht, Kamisarenka & Pajuste, supra note 34, at 13.
40. Stéphane Torck, L’attribution Automatique du Droit de Vote Double, 65 DROIT DES 
SOCIÉTÉS, no. 7, 18 (July 2014) Mariana Pargendler, The Grip of Nationalism on Corporate Law, 8 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 437, 2019), ssrn.com/abstract=3144451.
41. Renaud Mortier, Coup double pour l’État!, DROIT DES SOCIETES n°6, 1 (June 2015).
42. Becht, Kamisarenka & Pajuste, supra note 34, at 11–12.
43. GERMAIN & MAGNIER, supra note 15, at 376.
44. Art. 225-124 of the Code de Commerce; Cannu & Dondero, supra note 36, at 626.
45. Becht, Kamisarenka & Pajuste, supra note 34, Table 1 at 33.
46. C. CIV. 2015-990 (Fr.) [hereinafter the Loi Macron]. On the impact of the Loi Macron on 
the takeover waiver provided by the Loi Florange, see Loi Florange et droits de vote double auto-
matique—Nouvelles dispositions transitoires, MAYER BROWN, www.mayerbrown.com/files/
uploads/Documents/Paris/bloc-notes-7_2016.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
47. Alain Pietrancosta, The Latest Reform of French Takeover Law: The “Florange Act” of 
March 20, 2014, REVUE TRIMESTRELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER 42, 47 (2014); Charles Goyet, Nico-
las Rontchevsky & Michel Stork, L’impact de la loi Florange sur le driot des offres publiques 
d’acquisition et les sociétés cotées Françaises, REVUE TRIMESTRELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL ET DE
DROIT ECONOMIQUE 363, 366 (2014).
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threshold (30 percent or a further increase of 1 percent if the holding is greater 
than 30 percent but less than 50 percent)48 due to the attribution of additional 
voting rights,49 if the total amount of voting rights held in the period from April 
3, 2014, to December 31, 2018, has stayed lower or equal to the percentage of 
voting rights on April 2, 2014. The goal pursued by French law, which has no 
equivalent in Italy, is to allow major shareholders to disinvest, thereby increas-
ing liquidity while keeping their power by virtue of the double voting rights.
E. The New Belgian Companies and Associations Code
The bill to reform Belgian company law—presented to the Parliament on 
June 4, 2018, and approved by the Parliamentary Committee on Commercial 
and Business Law on October 23, 2018—documents the trend in Europe to 
move toward loyalty plans through legislation, based on tenured or multiple 
voting rights. Long-term shareholder bonuses are not applicable in Belgium yet, 
but will probably enter into force on May 1, 2019, for companies incorporated 
on or after that date, and on January 1, 2020, for existing companies.
The Belgian proposal departs from the traditional prohibition on issuing se-
curities with multiple voting rights and allotting more than one vote per share. 
Unlisted companies will be able to issue dual-class shares without a limit on the 
number of multiple voting rights. Listed companies will dispose of an optional 
double loyalty voting right, as introduced by the new Companies Code, which 
mirrors the French regime. However, closer to the more cautious Italian model, 
tenured voting can be adopted by companies with a two-thirds majority, or with 
a simple majority if the decision is adopted within the first year of the law’s en-
try into force. The holding loyalty period is fixed at twenty-four uninterrupted 
months;50 but, contrary to Italy and France, registration may precede the ten-
ured-voting shareholders’ resolution.
Tenured voting rights are lost in the event of a transfer of shares, except for 
donations, inheritances, mergers without changes in final control, or for the 
cancellation of loyalty voting rights. As in Italy, and unlike France, Belgian law 
focuses on avoiding the circumvention of the mandatory sunset clause, which 
states that additional voting rights should dissolve during an indirect transfer of 
underlying shares. Loyalty voting rights likewise lapse in case of a change of 
the shareholder entitled to the bonus rights.51
48. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [Commercial Code] Art. L433-3(1) (Fr.); Torck, supra
note 40, at 21.
49. Loi Macron Art. L. 194, supra note 46.
50. Chambre des Representants de Belgique, Projet de loi introduisant le Code des sociétés 
et des associations et portant de dispositions diverses Art. 7:53 [Belgian House of Representatives, 
Draft Law Introducing the Code of Companies and Associations and Laying Down Various Provi-
sions Art. 7:53] (Nov. 14, 2018).
51. Tom Vos, Are Loyalty Voting Rights Effective? Some Reflections on the Belgian Pro-
posals, CORP. FIN. LAB (Jul. 13, 2018), https://corporatefinancelab.org/2018/07/13/are-loyalty-
voting-rights-efficient/.
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F. Pros and Cons of Rewarding Shareholders’ Loyalty Through a Bigger Say
Deviations from the one share, one vote principle have found, over time, 
several arguments in favor and against. The purpose of this section is to provide 
a brief overview of these arguments and assess whether the loyalty-enhancing 
mechanism adopted in Italy and France for listed companies could alleviate 
some of the most controversial criticisms raised regarding dual-class shares 
with multiple voting rights.
1. The IPO Argument
It is widely accepted that a dual-class structure is efficient at the time of the 
IPO because it allows the talented founder, who is often most capable of run-
ning the company, to list the company while retaining control.52 In light of this, 
multiple voting securities facilitate the transition of companies from the private 
to the public dimension. The literature in the United States suggests that con-
trolling shareholders of newly listed companies do not necessarily extract pri-
vate benefits from their control; rather, they pursue a strategy that the market 
would otherwise not let them achieve. The founders’ role in companies such as 
Google, Facebook, and Snapchat reflects this idiosyncratic vision of corporate 
control.53
But the easy counterargument is that this view does not take into account 
the danger “of providing founders with perpetual or even lifetime control”
when, years after the IPO, she (or her heir) “might eventually become an inferi-
or leader due to aging or changes in the business environment.”54 To reduce the 
risk of excessive power in the hands of the founder’s family, a possible solution 
is to link multiple voting classes of securities to sunset clauses that interrupt, 
after a certain period, the perpetual dual-class structure.55 This solution is 
somewhat similar to the French and Italian approaches, which, in certain cir-
cumstances, remove the additional right to vote obtained as a loyalty bonus, 
even though the legislative intervention in both countries has not gone so far as 
52. Joseph A. McCarey, Erik P.M. Vermeulen & Masato Hisatake, The Present and Future 
of Corporate Governance: Re-Examinig the Role of the Board of Directors and Investor Relation in 
Listed Companies, 10 EUR. COMP. FIN. REV. 117, 122, 127 (2013); Renée Adams & Daniel Fer-
reira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence 11 (ECGI Finance Working Paper 
N°177/2007, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=987488; Guido Ferrarini, One Share – One 
Vote: A European Rule? 13 (ECGI Law Working Paper N°58/2006, 2006), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=875620.
53. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1669; Kirby Smith, The Agency Costs of Equal Treatment 
Clauses, YALE L. J.— FORUM 543, 550, (Dec. 4, 2017).
54. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class 
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV., 585, 590, 592 (2017). The costs related to the idiosyncratic vision, see su-
pra note 53, are represented by the “controller’s overvaluation of her strategy or execution of the 
strategy.” Smith, supra note 53, at 551.
55. Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 54, at 590.
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to require that loyalty voting rights lapse in cases of succession. Instead, com-
panies are left with an opt-in decision.
A similar situation has been observed in the United States: in companies 
with dual-class securities, it is sometimes provided that high-vote shares auto-
matically convert to low-vote shares upon transfer to a third party. The fact that, 
in the majority of these cases, the transfer of shares to the controller’s family 
members or trust is exempted from the conversion mechanism demonstrates 
that, without legislative intervention, controlling shareholders will not sponta-
neously abdicate the privilege attributed to the company’s founder.56 Recently, 
on October 24, 2018, the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) submitted a 
petition to both the NYSE and Nasdaq, asking them to agree not to list dual-
class shares with different voting rights in IPOs, unless a mandatory sunset 
clause makes all voting rights equal seven years after listing.57 Such a solution 
would also hinder the alleged perpetual benefit to the company’s founder.
2. Enhancing Shareholder Engagement
Recent developments in the traditional theory of agency costs support the 
favoring of shares with multiple voting rights to leverage the blockholder’s
power, thereby reducing managerial dictatorship58 and improving the share-
holders’ ability to monitor and intervene on behalf of all shareholders.59 This 
argument posits that in publicly held companies, increased voting power can 
reduce shareholder monitoring cost, creating a balance that may minimize the 
control costs of corporate governance.60
56. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, GEO. L. J. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 24) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128375).
57. John C. Coffee Jr., Dual Class Stock: The Shades Of Sunset, COLUM. L. SCH.: THE CLS
BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/11/19/dual-class-stock-
the-shades-of-sunset/; The need for sunset provisions is also emphasized in Commonsense Princi-
ple, The Millstein Center, The Common Sense Principle Of Corporate Governance 2.0, 7 
(Oct. 2018), https://millstein.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/images/Commonsense%20
Principles/CommonsensePrinciples2.0.pdf; For earlier highlights on the document, see Aabha 
Sharma, Howard Dicker, & Weil, Gotshal Manges LLP, Commonsense Principles 2.0: A Blueprint 
for U.S. Corporate Governance?, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG.
(Oct. 30, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/30/commonsense-principles-2-0-a-
blueprint-for-u-s-corporate-governance/.
58. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013); Rock, supra note 9, at 900; George Dent, The Essential Unity of 
Shareholders and the Myth of Investors Short-Termism, 35 Delaware L. J. 97, 142, 150 (2013).
59. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, One Share—One Vote: The Theory, 12 REV. FIN. 1, 1–4 
(2008); Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 
VA. L. REV. 807, 810 (1987).
60. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and 
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 769, 774, 815, 826 (2017), Gilson, supra note 7, at 1651.
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This view aligns with the latest global trend in corporate governance that 
calls for increased investor engagement in the company,61 and is upheld specifi-
cally in relation to the loyalty-enhancing mechanisms adopted in France and Ita-
ly.62 As long as the increased voting rights cannot be monetized—since they 
always dissolve at the time of sale— a tangible reason shareholders would ac-
crue this benefit lies in their actual interest in attending the general meeting of 
shareholders. The last decade has seen European countries doing their utmost to 
revitalize the shareholders’ general meeting as a constructive discussion forum. 
An example of this effort is the unique Spanish solution based on a special re-
ward for shareholders, consisting of a monetary bonus granted for attending the 
general assembly.63
In this regard, tenured voting may also facilitate communication between 
companies and their shareholders. Thanks to the registration process—a neces-
sary condition to accrue tenured voting—directors can easily reach out to the 
company’s shareholders, knowing their identity, to send them relevant company 
information to attend and actively participate to the shareholders’ general meet-
ing.64
Moreover, tenured voting rights increase shareholders’ importance to direc-
tors, both at the occurrence of the general meeting and outside and before the 
formalities of this appointment.65 Directors will be more inclined to engage in 
constructive and ongoing relations with their long-term shareholders, without 
limiting dialogue to the formalities of the general shareholders’ meeting. At the 
same time, retail investors or large passive shareholders have less incentive to 
gain double voting rights.
Even if shareholders who keep their shares for a longer period are not nec-
essarily those who strive for long-term shareholder value creation,66 this loyal-
ty-enhancing mechanism should nevertheless be seen as a reasonable approxi-
mation of such behavior—which, by giving more rights to shareholders who 
appear to be more concerned in the long-term prospects of the company, essen-
61. McCarey, Vermeulen & Hisatake, supra note 52, at 163; Cristoph van der Elst & Erik 
Vermeulen, Europe’s Corporate Governance Green Paper: Do Institutional Investors Matter? 1–16 
(Tilburg Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14, 2011), ssrn.com/abstract=1860144.
62. Quinby, supra note 1, at 403.
63. Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Governance in Europe: A Critical Review of the European 
Commission’s Initiative on Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 139, 
174, 177 (2015).
64. Lennarts & Koppert-van Breek, supra note 3, at 173; see also Therese Strand, Short-
Termism in the European Union, 22 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 15, 56 (2015) (discussing the benefits of 
shareholders’ identification).
65. Joseph A. McCahery, Zacharias Sautner & Laura Starks, Behind the Scenes: The Corpo-
rate Preference of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2914, 2924 (2016); see also Florian Mos-
lein & Karsten Engsig Sorensen, Nudging for Corporate Long-Termism and Sustainability: Regula-
tory Instruments from a Comparative and Functional Perspective, 24 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 391, 426 
(2017).
66. See Lennarts & Koppert-van Breek, supra note 3, at 175.
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tially weights voting rights on the basis of their interest.67 When managers over-
lap with long-term controlling shareholders, tenured voting rights can effective-
ly reinforce, from inside the firm, the long-term view of the former. From this 
perspective, tenured voting rights represent the experimental shifting of corpo-
rate democracy from the foundational principle of one share, one vote to a sys-
tem that more finely calibrates voting rights. It allows a move from the propor-
tional discrimination among shareholders to an attempt to weight the voting 
rights according to shareholders’ long-standing interest in the company.68
One reasonable criticism here is that since granting additional voting rights 
takes a fairly long time—two years after shareholder registration—it discour-
ages active investors who react quickly when they disagree with management 
strategy. However, in thoroughly examining the mechanism, shareholder regis-
tration may impact the strategic plans of the company. The knowledge of the 
voting rights’ future distribution that emerges from the register available to di-
rectors allows them to identify the presence of stable investors who are interest-
ed in the long-term profitability of the company, and whose voice will prospec-
tively be stronger in the future. It is assumed that long-term shareholders behave 
like residual claimants, on the basis of their interest in sustainably maximizing 
the profitability of the corporation.
Although less developed in the debate, it is worth mentioning the opinion 
that granting tenured voting rights to individual shareholders reduces insider 
trading.69 More precisely, insiders (namely, shareholders that receive private 
information by virtue of their relationship with management) cannot sell and 
repurchase shares without losing the additional voting rights received as a re-
ward for their loyalty. This view draws attention, in discussions of contractual 
mechanisms to increase shareholders’ power, to the interrelation between cor-
porate law and securities regulation: from this standpoint, “a powerful class of 
shareholders who have management’s ear and attention” could induce manage-
ment to give undue credence to them; at the same time, shareholders’ long-term 
engagement—one of the supposed benefits of tenured voting—is discouraged 
by “imposing fiduciary duties on shareholder stewards and treating them as 
covered by insider trading rules.”70
67. McCahery, Sautner & Starks, supra note 65, at 2914, 2924; see also Moslein & 
Sorensen, supra note 66.
68. See Collen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the Histo-
ry of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1366 (2006).
69. Edith Ginglinger & Jacques Hamon, Ownership, Control and Market Liquidity, 33 FIN.
61, 62 (2012) (Fr.).
70. Belinfanti, supra note 9, at 868; Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate 
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 27 (1991).
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3. Immunity From Takeover and Agency Costs
Looking at the drawbacks of multiple voting structures, one of the most fre-
quently cited concerns regarding multiple voting shares as control-enhancing 
mechanisms is the consequent immunity from hostile takeover. This is coupled 
with the belief that a concentrated ownership structure makes it difficult for di-
rectors to exercise their legal duty to act in the best interest of all shareholders.71
On the first point, tenured voting rights seem preferable to dual-class shares 
since they lead to a weaker form of corporate control, associated with a lower 
degree of immunity to hostile takeovers.72 Through time-phased voting all 
shareholders may mature additional rights on an ongoing basis, thus reducing 
the percentage of rights available only to majority shareholders. At the same 
time, investors can benefit from a high degree of secondary market liquidity that 
is not affected by the increase in shareholders’ voting power as such increase 
does not require any further acquisition of shares.73 However, an issue that has 
not yet been sufficiently analyzed by the economic literature is the extent to 
which tenured voting might have negative effects on the liquidity of trading 
markets, due to the reduction in the trading volume of loyal shareholders who 
are encouraged to keep their shares for longer.74
In addition, tenured voting rights may contribute to increased liquidity. 
Shareholders that gain control through these loyalty rewards can reduce their 
investment by retaining their original voting rights.75 Consequently, if disper-
sion increases, the defensive shield from takeovers lightens. From a political 
standpoint, both the Italian and French76 governments saw, in the adoption of 
tenured voting rights, an opportunity to generate cash by disinvesting from na-
tional enterprises without losing State ability to exercise control. It is also as-
serted that the market would not register a discount for “low-vote” shares as 
long as tenured voting rights are never attached to the company’s shares, and 
any transaction restores the one share, one vote rule.77
On the second point, despite extensive analysis in the literature on the cost 
of corporate control (such as distortions in investment decisions, tunneling, and 
failure of the market for corporate control), there is still a certain ambivalence 
of views. The fact that disproportionate cash flows and voting rights may dis-
71. Johan Erik Eklund & Thomas Poulsen, One Share-One Vote: Evidence from Europe, 24 
APPLIED FIN. ECON. 453 (2014).
72. See Becht, Kamisarenka & Pajuste, supra note 34, at 7.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Edelman, supra note 11, at 49.
75. Ginglinger & Hamon, supra note 69, at 27; Gilson, supra note 59, at 812; François Be-
lot, Edith Ginglinger & Laura T. Starks, Encouraging Long-Term Shareholders: The Effects of Loy-
alty Shares with Double Voting Rights, 15 (2017) available at http://fmaconferences.org/SanDiego/
Papers/loyaltysharesfmasubmission.pdf.
76. See generally Becht, Kamisarenka & Pajuste, supra note 34, at 11; Pietrancosta, supra 
note 47, at 47.
77. See Gilson, supra note 59, at 836.
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play a negative effect on the final value of the firm does not prove that such un-
evenness leads to a less efficient use of resources. The explanation for this 
mixed effect lies in the delicate balance between better monitoring, on one side, 
and the persistent incentive to divert resources, on the other. In other words, the 
benefits of disproportionate ownership are seen in less effort wasted by the con-
trolling shareholder in constant negotiations with minority shareholders; but this 
positive effect is counterbalanced by the risk that the former dilutes resources to 
the detriment of the latter. 78 In this respect, the political choice in favor of or 
against disproportionate cash flows and voting rights should consider that the 
entrenched problem of concentrating corporate control decreases in countries 
with greater investor protection, where owners divert fewer resources.79 Ten-
ured voting rights seem to better serve this purpose than a dual-class structure 
where the risk of insulating the controlling shareholder from market disciplinary 
is higher, and the stake owned may be small enough that the controlling share-
holder lacks powerful ownership-based incentives.80
4. Increased Transparency
As a final but important remark, loyalty-enhancing mechanisms based on 
time-phased voting can improve transparency if used as an alternative to other 
CEMs. Dual-class shares and pyramidal structures do not generally allow for 
immediate knowledge of the distribution of cash flow and voting rights unless 
insights about the layers of corporate ownership, cross-ownership, and the dis-
tribution of shares within different classes are available. The same concern re-
gards shareholders’ agreements which are often lacking transparency due to 
the uncertainties that, at the European level, surround the notion of sharehold-
ers’ agreements and their legal form.81 Instead, as will be analyzed, the main 
characteristic of tenured voting is, thanks to the registration process, a higher 
degree of transparency.82 It is theoretically possible that the diffusion of tenured 
voting will provide a valuable substitute to the use of shareholders’ agreements 
in continental Europe.
Within this theoretical framework, the empirical analysis presented in Part 
II aims to assess whether, in Italy, the double voting rights awarded to long-
term shareholders reflect some of the positive outcomes expected. The role of 
loyalty-enhancing mechanisms, as an attempt to achieve a healthier balance be-
78. Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Incentive and Entrenchment Effects in 
European Ownership, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2212, 2213 (2010).
79. See Bobby V. Reddy, The Fat Controller: Slimming Down the Excesses of Controlling 
Shareholders in UK Listed Companies, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 733, 740 (2018); Bennedsen & 
Nielsen, supra note 78, at 2220; Ferrarini, supra note 52, at 12.
80. See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 54, at 9–10.
81. Belot, Ginglinger & Starks, supra note 75, at 19; Bennedsen & Nielsen, supra note 78, at 
2216.
82. Vincenzo Cariello, Azioni a voto potenziato, “voti plurimi senza azioni” e tutela dei soci 
estranei al controllo, RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 164, 184 (2015).
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tween long- and short-term investment and governance, will be analyzed in 
practice.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A. From the Directors’ Proposal to the Shareholders’ Opt-In 
Resolution for Tenured Voting
Since the reform that allowed tenured voting for Italian listed companies, 39 
out of 256 issuers listed on the Italian stock exchange at the end of June 2018 
have introduced a clause in their articles of association that awards loyal share-
holders.83 These companies represent 8.32 percent of all capitalized assets.84
Where additional voting rights for loyalty are not the default rule—as in 
France after the Loi Florange—their adoption into articles of association is sub-
ject to shareholder approval. Some interesting considerations can be drawn from 
the decision-making process, beginning with the proposal, advanced by the 
board of directors to the general meeting of shareholders, for the introduction of 
a tenured voting clause in the company’s articles of association. An analysis of 
the reports submitted by directors and published on their companies’ websites
prior to shareholders’ general meetings85 reveals that in almost all cases, the 
proposal is justified with reference to the achievement of long-term objec-
tives.86 More precisely, a close link is established between the satisfaction of the 
company’s interest and the adoption of tenured voting, as a device that encour-
ages shareholders to keep their shares in the company for the long term; in some 
cases, the directors’ reports also mention the aim of enhancing shareholders’
loyalty. In other words, directors advised their shareholders to adopt a statutory 
83. Consolidated Law on Finance supra note 4, at Art. 127 (establishing that only companies 
whose shares are listed in a regulated market can introduce tenured voting). The lack of considera-
tion for companies with shares traded in multilateral trading facilities (so-called ‘alternative trading 
venues’) is reflected in the fact that, currently, none of the companies of AIM Italia provide for ten-
ured voting. Conversely, in some cases, AIM’s companies have issued dual-class shares with multi-
ple voting rights; in other cases, their articles of association contain the tenured voting clause that 
will become applicable in case of listing at a future date.
84. BORSA ITALIANA, Listed Companies Capitalisation June 2018,
https://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/statistiche/statistiche-storiche/capitalizzazioni/
capitalizzazioni.htm (Showing that on June 29, 2018 the average capitalisation of Italian listed com-
panies was 2.447,06 (in Euro M), and 1.321.82 (in Euro M) for companies with tenured voting. 
These figures exclude foreign companies listed in Italy; moreover, they exclude one company 
whose shares were suspended from trading by Borsa Italiana (in Table A, row 39). The capitalisa-
tion of Fiat Chrysler on 29 October 2014, when the company decided to reincorporate to benefit 
from the Netherlands’ more permissible legislation on multiple voting securities, was US$19.7 bil-
lion.).
85. Directive 2007/36 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the exercise of cer-
tain rights of shareholders in listed companies, art. 5(4)(d), 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17, 21 (EC) (hereinaf-
ter Shareholder Rights Directive, or SHRD).
86. See “Statements” column infra Table A.
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mechanism capable of increasing the holding period of the investment, so as to 
place the board in a better position to plan and implement long-term strategies 
and consequently to relieve directors from the pressure to deliver short-term re-
sults—in the proposals analyzed, reference to long-term strategies is, where not 
explicitly stated, always implied.
It is worth noting that in 30 companies out of 39, the proposal presented to 
the general meeting of shareholders clarifies that it received the approval of all 
board members, and that the presence, in seven cases, of at least one independ-
ent director appointed by minority shareholders did not interfere with the una-
nimity of views on tenured voting.87
In Italy, the introduction of tenured voting is subject to the approval of the 
extraordinary meeting of shareholders with a two-thirds majority.88 In such a 
system, where controlling shareholders are often in a position to influence the 
resolution, it would have been appropriate to provide for the so-called “white-
wash” procedure (the additional requirement that the resolution receives the fa-
vorable votes of the majority of minority shareholders). Even if already known 
and used in Italy, the Consolidated Law on Finance does not impose this mech-
anism as a necessary condition for approving tenured voting resolutions. Look-
ing at the outcomes of the general meetings where tenured rights were proposed 
and approved, the resistance of the dissenting or abstaining shareholders emerg-
es, in some cases despite them not succeeding in blocking the final approval.89
Instead, in France, as already noted, the results of the general shareholders’
meetings varied, since in a few cases they failed to revert from the default ten-
ured voting provision to the one share, one vote rule.90
The empirical evidence confirms that the majority rule with no correction, 
leads to a sort of natural selection of the types of companies that allow share-
holders to mature additional voting rights. It is intuitively easier for firms with a 
strong controlling shareholder (lacking a “blocking” minority) to approve such 
a clause, particularly in the absence of significant stakes owned by institutional 
investors (or asset managers), who traditionally tend to disregard directors’ pro-
posals for tenured voting and to vote against its adoption.91 In Italy, the asset 
managers’ association has expressly supported the recommendation of leading 
proxy advisors for their clients to vote against the introduction of loyalty vot-
87. See “Independent Directors/Minority” and “Board Unanimity” columns infra Table A.
88. Art. 2368(2) C.c. (requiring a two-thirds majority of the voting share capital represented 
in the extraordinary meeting of shareholders, and the shareholders’ meeting is regularly convened 
with the presence of the majority of the share-voting capital. However, in the period after the entry 
into force of the Law No. 116/2014 and until the end of December 2015, the adoption of the tenured 
voting rights clause was eased by reducing to a simplified majority the percentage of voting rights 
required to approve directors’ proposals. By exploiting this provision, only three companies adopted 
tenured voting rights). See “General Meetings” column infra Table A.
89. See “Quorum” column infra Table A.
90. See supra Part I(4).
91. Belot, Ginglinger & Starks, supra note 75, at 5, 20.
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ing.92 In France, the position of proxy advisors is quite similar, as they support 
the proposals to opt out of the default rule that implemented tenured voting in 
all listed companies.93 These considerations seem consistent with the finding 
that family firms are the most likely (and almost only) users of the new CEMs, 
and where the existence of a dominant shareholders’ group makes it difficult for 
other shareholders to resist the transaction.94
B. Failure of the Voluntary Adoption of Sunset Clauses
A close examination of the sample companies’ articles of association re-
veals substantial homogeneity in corporate choices. Specifically, in all cases the 
vesting period for double voting is two years and always consists of a drastic 
doubling of the voting right;95 thus, companies neither used the freedom to ex-
tend the vesting period of maturity (as has been observed in French compa-
nies)96 nor provided for a gradual enhancement of voting rights over time.97
The option of inserting the most significant sunset clause—the revocation of 
increased voting rights in the event of heredity—has also been ignored, and un-
der no circumstances will additional voting rights dissolve in case of succession 
by virtue of an opted-in provision. When double voting rights are granted as a 
reward to the company’s founder, this benefit can easily and permanently pass 
to heirs.98 It is then clear that the advantages claimed by the supporters of ten-
ured voting (allegedly enhancing the benefit of non-permanent and non-
transmissible CEMs) remain theoretical in this debate.
With regard to the other opt-in and opt-out choices, the range of possible so-
lutions is wide, even if no significant differences result from the observations of 
the companies’ articles of association. There is a notable absence of opting-out 
cases from the provisions allowing double voting rights to be maintained in case 
92. ASSOGESTIONI, NOTA TECNICA SUL VOTO MAGGIORATO IN ITALIA E ALL’ESTERO (Dec. 
23, 2014), http://www.assogestioni.it/index.cfm/1,147,10681,49,html/voto-maggiorato-e-voto-
plurimo-un-vulnus-al-principio-di-one-share-one-vote.
93. Goyet et al., supra note 15, at 367.
94. Ettore Croci, Controlling-Enhancing Mechanism: Loyalty Shares and Multiple-Voting 
Shares in Italy, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE 1 (June, 2018), www.ecgi.global/
sites/default/files/6._controlling-enhancing_mechanisms-_loyalty_shares_and_multiple-voting_
shares_in_italy.pdf.
95. See infra Columns ‘Multiplier’ and ‘Loyalty’ of Table A.
96. See infra Part. I.
97. In Table A rows 4, 8 correspond to cases where articles of association state that the right 
to double voting is not generally applicable; but it only concerns specific resolutions identified in 
the articles of association.
98. Consolidated Law on Finance supra note 4, at Art. 127–quinquies (3)(a). Some of the 
companies’ articles of association allow the preservation of bonus voting rights also in cases of do-
nation to the heirs or constitution of a trust, whose beneficiaries are the shareholder’s heirs; others 
preserve these rights when the holding is transferred from one fund to another, if both are managed 
by the same investment management company.
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of a merger or demerger of the shareholder entitled to double voting,99 as well 
as a free share capital increase.100 Conversely, all companies opted in, as per-
mitted by law, to allow a proportional extension of the double voting right in the 
event of a capital increase by payment.101
Tenured voting rights were adopted in four cases, in connection with the 
IPO of the company. The opportunity, available to companies that go public, to
date back the maturity period of additional voting rights before the listing, was 
exploited in three cases.102 With regard to the other incentives for companies to 
go public, multiple voting rights as a specific class of securities do not seem to 
boost this limited trend. Although shares carrying multiple voting rights can be 
maintained after the listing process, only two newly listed companies have dual-
class shares and, because of this choice, will not be entitled to introduce tenured 
voting in the future.103
C. Power Distribution Before Maturity: Identikit of the 
Registered Shareholders
At the end of 2016, the average percentage owned by controlling sharehold-
ers of Italian companies was 46.9 percent, which is in line with the country’s 
traditionally concentrated ownership structure.104
The data in Table B reflects in the companies with tenured voting rights into 
four groups in descending order of controlling power. Group a) represents the 
companies that, at the starting date of the maturity period, were controlled by a 
single shareholder with statutory control—i.e., who held more than 50 percent 
of the voting rights (in most cases this shareholder was the first—often the on-
ly—one who asked for registration); Group b) is made up of companies in 
which the “Registered Shareholder” held an ownership interest in the company 
of between 45 and 50 percent of the voting rights. Group c) is characterized by 
the presence of a shareholder holding between 30 and 45 percent of the voting 
rights; and Group d) consists of companies in which no shareholder owns more 
99. Id. The default provision—that additional voting rights do not dissolve in case of merger 
or demerger of the entitled shareholder—provides fertile ground for elusion Ventoruzzo, supra note 
23, at 14. Mergers or demergers may result in a substantial change of ownership for the shareholder, 
who can keep their double voting rights unless the company has opted out. However, in this respect, 
the clauses of the articles of association should be carefully examined; in fact, in some cases con-
tained in Table A, rows 1, 4, 31, & 36, the clause excludes that double voting rights can be main-
tained when, as result of the merger or demerger, a change of control occurs. One single complete 
opt-out has been registered. (See Table A at row 38.)
100. Consolidated Law on Finance, supra note 4 at Art. 127–quinquies (3)(b).
101. Consolidated Law on Finance, supra note 4 at Art. 127–quinquies (4).
102. Consolidated Law on Finance, supra note 4. at Art. 127–quinquies (7).
103. Consolidated Law on Finance, supra note 4, at Art. 127–sexies (2)(3).
104. CONSOB, REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES 9
(2017) (showing the weighted mean decreases to 34 percent, data does not include cooperatives).
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than 30 percent.105 This analysis shows that Group a) is unequivocally the larg-
est, since it includes 23 companies; seven companies are then included in Group 
b); four companies in Group c); and, finally, in only five companies does the 
first shareholder hold an interest of less than 30 percent, as classified in Group 
d) (although in one of these cases this shareholder participates in a controlling 
shareholders’ agreement; in another is the member of the controlling family). 
Three of the four newly listed companies belong to Group a).
As discussed, directors’ reports always advise shareholders to adopt tenured 
voting on the basis of the need to enhance shareholders’ long-termism and, im-
plicitly, long-term strategies. At the same time, the clear dominance of strong, 
controlling shareholders in the ownership of companies with tenured voting 
seems to contradict this urgency. Such an ownership structure, in other words, 
already gives a clear indication of the presence of stable and long-term share-
holders,106 and the effectiveness of introducing tenured voting for retaining 
shareholders over the long term is questionable. Given the close proximity of 
the controlling shareholder to the board of directors, the latter is typically reas-
sured by the former before engaging in any long-term strategies; likewise, di-
rectors’ proposals to shareholders’ meetings (including the proposal to adopt 
tenured voting) already reflect the ex ante approval received from the control-
ling shareholders. From this viewpoint, the Italian legislation seems to do little 
to encourage long-term shareholders—it rather allows companies to empower 
existing long-term shareholders.107 The findings presented in Part II(5) are con-
sistent with this logic.
105. This division into groups, reflecting different levels of concentration in the ownership 
structure, is derived from the mandatory offer regulation. Although adopted in Europe with degrees 
of variability, the most typical takeover bid threshold is 30 percent (and it has been the only one in 
Italy until 2014), presumptively considered a clear indication of strong corporate control. (See 
Christoph van der Elst, The influence of shareholder rights on shareholder behaviour, 124 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER 50–62, 52 (2010)). Italy has also introduced a threshold for 
‘creeping acquisitions’, which imposes a mandatory offer when, over a 12-months period of time, a
certain percentage of shares is purchased (or matured) by a shareholder owing more than 30 percent 
but less than 50 percent of the company’s voting rights; as a consequence, a shareholder owing 
more than 45 percent can increase her holding without incurring the obligation of mandatory offer.
106. Ginevri, supra note 19, at 595, 608, 617.
107. There is some evidence of the assessment undertaken by Italian companies with dis-
persed ownership structures, on the introduction of tenured voting, also involving in a dialogue with 
major shareholders. It was the case, in particular, of Generali. The financial press reported that a 
‘survey’ on the opportunity to introduce voting rights was carried out in 2015, in response to pres-
sure from a number of significant non-financial shareholders, while the main institutional investors 
opposed the amendment of the articles of association in this respect. Generali, per BlackRock il voto 
multiplo é <<problematico>>, INTERMEDIA (May 26, 2018), (http://www.intermediachannel.it/
generali-per-blackrock-il-voto-multiplo-e-problematico/). In the end, the company did not adopt 
tenured voting.
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D. Potential (and Unpredictable) Variation in the Total Number of 
Voting Rights, and the Limits of Transparency
The empirical evidence presented in Table B predicts the distribution of 
voting rights among shareholders in each company with tenured voting rights. 
As of the observation date (June 2018), in some cases, double voting rights had 
already matured in relation to all or part of the shares registered, while in other 
cases the maturity period was still due. For this reason, the overview provided 
should be considered with some warnings. First, given certain circumstances 
(the number of shares issued and the own shares held by the company), the 
number of voting rights can evolve over time because other shareholders (as 
distinct from the “Registered Shareholder”) may have applied or may apply for 
registration to mature their voting rights at different times, while others may 
lose the benefit of double voting, or lose the right to mature this benefit, if they 
transfer their shares. In addition, shareholders are always allowed, by a clause 
provided in all companies’ articles of association, to renounce all or part of the 
additional voting rights attributed to them, or they can withdraw their registra-
tion to interrupt the maturity period.108
In this scenario, requiring companies with tenured voting to disclose the to-
tal number of rights on the fifth day of each calendar month after the monthly 
period in which the total stock of voting rights has increased or decreased en-
hances transparency.109 This information is necessary for shareholders to assess 
the percentage of voting rights held (which fluctuate alongside decreases or in-
creases in total voting rights), and to comply with the transparency regulation of 
mandatory ownership disclosure.110
The mechanism relies upon the companies to keep a special register, with 
the support of intermediaries acting as depositaries on behalf of shareholders. 
Following the shareholders’ registration, the depositary will provide the compa-
ny with the certificate of ownership and inform the company of any transfer in-
108. The withdraw is definitive, but the shareholder can always apply for a new registration 
that corresponds with the starting date of a new maturity period. (See Art. 127 c.c. –quinquies (1) 
Italian Consolidated Law on Finance). Renouncing (both before and after the attribution of addi-
tional voting rights) is a useful tool when, by virtue of the reward for loyalty consisting of additional 
voting rights, the shareholder may incur the obligation to announce a mandatory offer. See Part III 
Section (2).
109. Art. 143 –quarter (5) of Regulation No. 11971 of 14 May 1999 and subsequent amend-
ments [hereinafter Consob Regulation].
110. Art. 9 of Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, amend-
ed by Directive 2013/50/EU of 22 October 2013 on the harmonization of transparency require-
ments [hereinafter Transparency Directive] requires the shareholders of the Italian companies to 
disclose their holdings when they pass, because of acquisition or because of tenured voting the 3 
percent threshold (it was 2 percent until the end of 2016), or the 5 percent threshold for small and 
medium enterprises (SME)—Art. 120(2) of the Consolidated Law on Finance, supra note 4 (the so 
called mandatory ownership disclosure). Hereinafter ‘Relevant shareholders’ are those shareholders 
whose holding is above these relevant percentages. As will be analyzed in Part III, knowledge of the 
total amount of voting rights is also necessary for shareholders to assess the implications arising 
from the mandatory offer obligation.
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terrupting the maturity period. The register is a key tool for transparency. The 
right to access the register allows directors and shareholders to predict the most 
likely future distribution of voting power at each maturity date.111
Such transparency cannot, however, be considered complete, as the entire 
content of the register is not technically public—it is available only to directors 
and shareholders by request. Disclosure on company websites is limited to the 
identity of the relevant registered shareholders.112 Hence, the market can predict 
how voting rights will vary over time, with a degree of error given that non-
relevant shareholders might also have registered their shares to gain bonus 
rights.
This system impacts the present empirical analysis. The ability to under-
stand the long-term intentions of the registered shareholders suffers a certain 
degree of inaccuracy from the fact that not all registrations are publicly availa-
ble before their maturity date. However, even considering this warning, tenured 
voting rights are presented with a high degree of transparency. The public avail-
ability of the company’s register can be considered a good proxy of relevant 
shareholder intentions regarding tenured voting.113 An equivalent level of trans-
parency is not found in other common CEMs.114
E. Voting Distribution After Maturity: 
The Achievement of a Supermajority
The entry date of Table B shows that in 20 cases at least one shareholder 
had, by June 2018, already earned the reward of decoupling the voting rights 
related to their registered shares. Thanks to the transparency requirements, the 
voting rights owned by each “Registered Shareholder” are publicly available 
on the Consob website.115 Moreover, since companies must disclose monthly 
variations in the total amount of their voting rights, it was possible to identify if 
other registered shareholders have matured additional voting rights. As a conse-
quence, the information in the column “Empowerment” includes this dilutive 
effect. Looking at the company register, it was also possible to discern the regis-
tration of other relevant shareholders—in the column “Dilution Post-
Empowerment”—who will soon mature new additional voting rights.
When the maturity period is “still due,” the picture of the future distribution 
of power is instead taken from the directors’ report (prepared for the general 
meeting of shareholders), which contains information about the most predicta-
ble effect on the company’s voting structure after rewarding the majority share-
holder with additional bonus rights.116 When this information is not available, 
111. Consob Regulation, supra note 109, at (4).
112. Consob Regulation, supra note 109.
113. See infra Table B, in the column “Dilution Post-Empowerment”.
114. See supra Part I(6.4); see also Belot, Ginglinger & Starks supra note 75.
115. See infra Table B, “[OS]” in the column “Empowerment”.
116. See infra Table B, “[D]” in the column “Empowerment”.
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or other relevant shareholders have simultaneously registered their shares, the 
voting distribution is a projection of its level at these registrations’ date of ma-
turity.117 As explained, this result may underestimate the dilutive effect of the 
voting rights to be attributed to non-relevant shareholders, whose registration is 
not public.
Despite these warnings, which are due to the potential ongoing variability of 
voting rights, the findings show a sharp increase in the voting power of share-
holders who matured (or prospectively will mature) tenured voting rights. In 
several cases, the achievement of double voting rights enables the controlling 
shareholder to exercise decisive influence over the extraordinary general meet-
ing, empowering this shareholder to the point that amendments to the compa-
ny’s articles of association, or mergers and acquisitions where the shareholders’
voice is required, only depends upon her vote.
In Italy, any decision of the extraordinary meeting of shareholders is taken 
with a two-thirds majority of the share capital represented at the meeting. In 19 
of 39 cases, thanks to the maturity of additional voting rights, the decision of 
the controlling shareholder will necessarily correspond to the final outcome of 
the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting.118 In 12 other cases, it is likewise rea-
sonable that the controlling shareholder’s vote will be the determinant in the as-
sembly. The conclusion can be inferred by considering that 70 percent is the av-
erage capital represented at the shareholders’ meetings of Italian listed 
companies;119 consequently, all shareholders with voting rights above two-
thirds of this percentage impose their vote in shareholders’ meetings.120 In these 
cases, a double check was made: upon maturity, the empowered shareholder al-
so disposes of two-thirds of the voting rights of the presence quorum at the gen-
eral shareholders’ meeting that introduced the tenured voting (in some cases, 
such presence was higher than the above-mentioned 70 percent).
As shown in Table B, the dilutive effect of such pronounced empowerment 
is marginal. Controlling shareholders did not take the opportunity presented by 
the increase in voting rights as a chance to reduce their stake in the company 
while maintaining control. This is not surprising: as the literature predicted for 
family-owned companies, this finding is consistent with the use of tenured vot-
ing by shareholders as a means of empowering existing long-terms sharehold-
ers, rather than encouraging new long-term shareholders.121 In other words, 
strong shareholders used their tenured voting rights to become highly dominant 
in all corporate decisions. In this context, the dilution effect also appears to be 
overall marginal because of the registration of other shareholders. This might 
117. See infra Table B, “[F]” in the column “Empowerment” (forecast generated by calculat-
ing all the voting rights attributed to the first shareholder/the amount of the company’s voting 
rights).
118. See infra Table B, “Absolute Dominance” in the column “Empowerment”.
119. Consob Regulation, supra note 109.
120. See infra Table B, “Dominance” in the column “Empowerment”.
121. Dallas & Barry, supra note 8, at 548, 552.
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hypothetically change in the subsequent months if other shareholders are 
awarded double voting rights.
The lack of institutional investors and asset managers among the relevant 
beneficiaries of time-phased voting122 is consistent with the traditional view al-
leging their indifference toward the opportunity to increase their power in the 
general meeting of shareholders. This is due to their short-term perspective, 
based on the need of institutional investors to constantly show their beneficiar-
ies successful investment strategies and positive returns.123 This observation 
supports those skeptical opinions that advocate against tenured voting as a solu-
tion to a perceived short-termism problem.124 Indeed, it seems that these inves-
tors have no incentive to apply to register their shares, lacking any interest in 
demonstrating, either publicly or to the company’s directors, their long-term 
view. In light of this, contrary to some intuitive expectations, time-phased vot-
ing rights have not been shown to improve visible forms of engagement or ac-
tivism by shareholders. Many believe that the preferred form of activism for 
professional investors takes place outside the general meeting. These investors 
are likely to be much more interested in engaging in informal dialogue with di-
rectors, raising concerns that they often “operate outside the limits of share-
holder power defined by regulation,” and that they try “to circumvent the exist-
ing legal devices regulating shareholder voice.”125
III. EXPLAINING WHY TAKEOVER LAW IS INVOLVED
A. Tenured Voting and European Takeover Law
The mandatory offer, a burdensome obligation for anyone wishing to ac-
quire corporate control of a European listed company, does not find an equiva-
lent rule in US corporate law and securities regulation. Among the few compul-
sory rules, the Takeover Bids Directive126 requires Member States to adopt the 
mandatory offer provision—namely, the obligation to announce a public offer 
in the case of controlling acquisitions.
This piece of legislation, dating back to 2004, provides for only a minimum 
level of harmonization, thus allowing for a wide margin of flexibility at the 
Member State level.127 However, it established two main pillars that national 
legislators should consider when developing more technical rules. Under the 
first pillar, the acquisition by a shareholder (or group of parties acting in con-
cert) of a percentage of the voting rights conferring control requires the an-
122. Id. at 620.
123. Quinby, supra note 1, at 391, 397; Sacco Ginevri, supra note 19, at 601.
124. Fried, supra note 9, at 1574.
125. McCahery et al., supra note 65, at 2912; van der Elst & Vermeulen, supra note 61, at 7.
126. Takeover Directive, supra note 10.
127. Pargendler, supra note 40, at 20–22.
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nouncement of a mandatory offer, in the form of a total offer to other share-
holders with voting rights.128 The second pillar consists of the adoption of a 
straightforward definition of corporate control—based on a specific percentage 
of voting rights settled by the Member States —for the purposes of takeover 
bids,129 in response to the uncertainties that may arise from the use of an indefi-
nite notion of control. When the EU enacted this solution, it was not revolution-
ary, but rather replicated the long-standing and successful experience of the UK 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, where the threshold level was set at 30 
percent of voting rights by a rule still in force.130 Many Member States have 
adopted this solution,131 including Italy, where the 30 percent threshold still ap-
plies in certain circumstances (particularly if it is exceeded by a shareholder en-
titled, after maturity, to loyalty voting rights).
The mandatory offer is a powerful tool for the protection of minority share-
holders, consisting of a special right of withdrawal, which operates in case of a 
change of corporate control, coupled with the right to receive part of the premi-
um paid by the offeror.132 Regarding the first point, the mandatory offer regula-
tion embodies the implicit promise to shareholders that, in case of a change in 
the ownership structure of the company, they will get the opportunity to disin-
vest.133 In other words, minority shareholders are granted a special exit right 
when the controlling threshold is exceeded as a result of a private transaction 
involving corporate control or market shares acquisitions. This is a particularly 
market-oriented solution134 that gives each individual shareholder the possibil-
ity to decide whether or not to remain in the company. Moreover, the provision 
that the offer be announced at “the highest price paid for the same securities”135
by the offeror deploys a redistributive effect in favor of minority shareholders, 
who will get the same premium paid (if a premium had been paid) for acquiring 
control of the company.
128. See Takeover Directive, supra note 10, at Art. 5(1).
129. See id. at Art. 5(3).
130. PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 9.1 (12th ed. 2016); 
Mathias Habersack, Non-frustration Rule and Mandatory Bid Rule – Cornerstones of European 
Takeover Law, 15 EUR. COMPANY FIN. L. REV. 1, 29 (2018).
131. See Klaus J. Hopt, European Takeover Reform of 2012/2013—Time to Re-examine the 
Mandatory Bid, 15 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 143, 173 (2014).
132. Nuria Alcade & Inés Pérez-Soba, Has the EU Takeover Directive Improved Minority 
Shareholder Protection? The Spanish Evidence, 17 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 261, 263, 283 (2016); 
see Hopt, supra note 63, at 198.
133. See Jennifer Payne, Minority Shareholder protection in takeovers: A UK perspective, 8 
EUR. COMPANY FIN. L. REV. 145, 150 (2011); Jonathan Mukwiri, Takeovers and Incidental Protec-
tion of Minority Shareholders, 10 EUR. COMPANY FIN. L. REV., 432, 442 (2013).
134. See Hopt, supra note 131, at 169; Georgios Psaroudakis, The Mandatory Bid and Com-
pany Law in Europe, 10 EUR. COMPANY FIN. L. REV. 550, 553 (2010); Habersack, supra note 130,
at 32.
135. See Takeover Directive, supra note 10.
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In this context, the entry into force of tenured voting rights in Italy was fol-
lowed, a few months later, by a complex revision of the system of thresholds 
that identify when the obligation to announce a mandatory offer arises. Even if 
a decisive boost to the reform was also driven by the widespread belief that a 
lower threshold—lower than the 30 percent traditionally adopted in the coun-
try—was a necessary tool to reinforce investor protection,136 the sudden appear-
ance of tenured voting rights in corporate law imposed a significant redrafting 
of the rules on mandatory offers.
It is questionable to what extent tenured voting rights should be included in 
calculating the relevant threshold. This choice, made by the Italian legislator 
(and by the French one), imposes the obligation to launch a bid when the 30 
percent threshold is exceeded as a result of increased voting rights.137 Despite 
the obvious consideration that voting rights similarly affect the corporate deci-
sion on whether or not the shareholder owns the same percentage of shares, the 
two situations cannot be considered equivalent for several reasons. First, in-
creasing voting rights as a reward for shareholder loyalty is less stable than dis-
posing of the same percentage as property rights in a company without tenured 
voting. Second, the maturity of tenured voting rights does not alter the number 
of shares on the market available to shareholders interested in acquiring a rele-
vant stake in the company (in other words: with tenured voting the contestabil-
ity of corporate control changes less than in the case of share acquisition). Fi-
nally, since the tenured voting rights are cost-free, there is no premium for 
corporate control—thus, minority shareholders are not entitled to any price dis-
tribution. However, the latter is a weak argument, as it is now fairly established 
that the mandatory offer consists of a special exit right for minority sharehold-
ers, whereas the redistribution of corporate control occurs only eventually.138
136. The 1998 Italian takeover regulation was modified in 2014, when a complex system of 
thresholds replaced the single one fixed at 30%, still in force for tenured rights. The result achieved 
by the reform was, in most cases, to lower the relevant threshold to 25% in companies that are not 
classified as SME (small medium enterprises); while the applicable threshold is 30% in the (rare) 
case of an existing controlling shareholder already owing more than 25% and less than 50%. At the 
same time, SME were granted the freedom to provide in their articles of association for a different 
threshold, not lower than 25% and not higher than 40%: see Art. 106(1)(1-bis)(1-ter) of the Consol-
idated Law on Finance, supra note 6. As the literature points out, the discussion on the optimal level 
of threshold is not simple. When a certain threshold is settled, control packages below this percent-
age may be transferred without involving the obligation to launch an offer. In Italy in 2014, the pro-
posal to lower the takeover threshold found fertile ground, thus increasing the costs of corporate 
acquisition in line with the view that considers mandatory offers the most effective takeover de-
fence. Johannes W. Fedderke & Marco Ventoruzzo, The Biases of an ‘Unbiased’ Optional Takeo-
vers Regime: The Mandatory Bid Threshold as a Reverse Drawbridge 4, 12 (European Corp. Gov-
ernance Inst., Working Paper No. 304, 2016), (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2706602); Luca Enriques 
& Matteo Gatti, Creeping Acquisitions in Europe: Enabling Companies to Be Better Safe than Sorry
30 (European Corp. Goveranance Inst., Working Paper No. 264, 2014), (https://ssrn.com/abstract_
id=2492158; Payne, supra note 133, at 151.
137. Consolidated Law on Finance supra note 4, at Art. 106(1).
138. Psaroudakis, supra note 134, at 554, 557.
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The Takeover Bids Directive explicitly provides that the mandatory offer 
threshold be exceeded in the event of an acquisition of shares by a single share-
holder or by a group of shareholders acting in concert. In line with this, share-
holders’ agreements, whose impact on corporate control is undeniable, are not 
explicitly included in the directive as events triggering the mandatory offer ob-
ligation.139 In Italy, while such agreements are commonly considered a stable 
means of exercising corporate control, they do not necessarily require the an-
nouncement of a mandatory offer obligation unless acquisitions occurred in the 
12 months preceding the agreement.140 The approach is different when it comes 
to tenured voting rights: in Italy and France, the maturity of the additional vot-
ing rights, even without any further share acquisitions, is not costless to the loy-
al shareholder if the mandatory offer is triggered.
The results of the empirical analysis outlined in Part II support some general 
conclusions about this setting. The optimum takeover threshold is a complex 
political choice left by the directive to the Member States; the adoption of ten-
ured voting has made the taxonomy even more intricate. The issue has become, 
then, not only whether a greater degree of uniformity across Europe is need-
ed,141 but also whether the case of tenured voting rights should not be treated 
differently.
B. Mandatory Offer and Tenured Voting:
Obligations and Exemptions
The Italian system is a complex balance between obligations and waivers. 
On the one hand, it imposes a mandatory offer if one shareholder (or a group 
acting in concert) matures voting rights above the relevant threshold, but the 
same threshold has not been exceeded for share capital. Conversely, the acquisi-
tion of a holding corresponding to the relevant threshold does not necessarily 
imply the obligation to announce a mandatory offer if, due to the dilution effect 
caused by other loyal shareholders, the acquirer does not have voting rights ex-
ceeding the relevant threshold. 142
139. Hopt, supra note 131, at 180; Psaroudakis, supra note 134, at 557; Martin Winner, Ac-
tive Shareholders and European Takeover Regulation, 11 EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 364, 369, 
(2014).
140. The maximum duration for shareholder agreement settlement is three years, but renewal 
is always possible. See Articles 101-bis(4), 109 and 123 of the Consolidated Law on Finance, supra 
note 4; Winner, supra note 139, at 370.
141. See Marco Lamandini & David Ramos Muñoz, EU FINANCIAL LAW. AN
INTRODUCTION, 344, (2016).
142. The two situations can be better represented through numerical examples. In the first 
case, a shareholder owning 18% of the share capital, if awarded with double voting rights (where no 
other shareholder mature double voting), will have the right to exercise 30.05% of the total voting 
rights; thus triggering the mandatory offer. In the second example, the acquisition of 30% of the 
voting share capital (assuming this is as a relevant takeover threshold) allows the exercise of 27% of 
the voting rights of a pre-existing shareholder—owning, for example, 10% of the share capital—has 
doubled her voting rights. According to the Consob regulation, the mandatory offer will trigger only 
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The creeping acquisition—namely, the “surreptitious building of a stake 
large enough to secure control”143—may also require the announcement of a 
mandatory offer. Such a provision, which is not common to all Member 
States,144 is present in Italy, France, and the United Kingdom; it operates when, 
from a weaker level of corporate control, the majority shareholder approaches 
statutory control in a limited period of time. Specifically, in Italy, it occurs if a 
shareholder who holds more than 30 percent but less than the statutory control 
(50 percent) acquires (or matures) more than 5 percent of voting shares or vot-
ing rights in 12 months (the equivalent rule in France provides that the increase 
must not exceed 1 percent).145
This rigorous system, which broadened takeover regulation in the case of 
tenured voting rights, prioritizes investor protection as the main goal of the Eu-
ropean financial market framework. It assumes that minority shareholders will 
withdraw their investment in case of significant change (or consolidation) in the 
company shareholding (and power) structure.146 Such change or consolidation 
can occur after share acquisition or because of the maturity of tenured voting. 
Therefore, it is also consistent with the two main exemptions to the obligation 
to announce a mandatory offer, which apply when increased voting rights cause 
only temporary changes in the distribution of voting powers among sharehold-
ers.
The first exemption is based on the fact that the threshold is exceeded only 
temporarily when the shareholder decides not to exercise the voting rights 
above the relevant percentage and to instead sell or reduce them within 12 
months. Such a reduction may also be caused by an expected dilution of voting 
rights, which can be predicted through access to the company’s register or by 
the shareholder’s decision to waive, even partially, the additional matured vot-
ing rights. This exemption explains why all the Italian companies allowed their 
shareholders to renounce the additional matured rights. The second exemption 
applies if the relevant mandatory offer threshold is unintentionally exceeded by 
a loyal shareholder, due to a decrease in the total amount of the company’s vot-
if the majority shareholder will accrue—due to a decrease in the number of the company’s voting 
rights—her percentage above the relevant threshold, an event that may never occur or occurs long 
after the acquisition. Such a regulatory solution is questionable as the realignment of the share capi-
tal with voting rights and the voting rights can take place considerably after the acquisition of the 
relevant shareholding; see Chiara Mosca, La maggiorazione del voto, il presupposto dell’obbligo di 
offerta pubblica di acquisto e le altre novità in materia di soglie opa, LE NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI 
COMMENTATE 863, 873 f (2015).
143. Enriques & Gatti supra note 136, at 3.
144. See Hopt, supra note 131, at 161.
145. Consolidated Law on Finance, supra note 4 at Art. 106(3), (b); Art. 46 of Consob Regu-
lation, supra note 111; Art. L433-3(1) of the CODE MONÉTAIRE ET FINANCIER [C. MON. FIN.]
[MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CODE] art. L433-3(1) (Fr.) (corresponding to France); CITY CODE ON 
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS 2016, Rule 9.1 (UK), http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=8Jan2018.
146. See Psaroudakis, supra note 134, at 559.
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ing rights, depending on other shareholders’ behavior (as in the case of transfer 
of the underlying shares).147
No exemption reduces the powerful deterrent effect that the mandatory offer 
has on the adoption of loyalty-enhancing mechanisms based on a voting power 
reward. Within the system of European takeover law there is no reasonable ex-
pectation that companies without a highly concentrated ownership structure will 
adopt tenured voting; as a matter of fact, their shareholders would not be inter-
ested in tenured voting insofar as they would be affected by the mandatory of-
fer. Takeover regulation, as an exogenous factor, hinders the goal of empower-
ing long-term shareholder. The situation radically changes, though, for existing 
controlling shareholders, to whom the described mechanism of takeover thresh-
olds does not apply. The empirical evidence supports this conclusion.
C. How Takeover Regulation Shapes the 
Selection of Companies with Tenured Voting
Takeover regulation demonstrates the strong relationship between securities 
regulation and corporate law, and the mandatory offer obligation becomes a de-
cisive exogenous factor that interferes with the choices of companies to reward 
their shareholders with tenured voting.
On the one hand, because of the obligation to launch an offer, achieving 
double voting rights is no longer cost-free above the relevant threshold. It de 
facto curbs the maturity of additional voting rights, hindering shareholders from 
exploiting this benefit when the threshold will be exceeded. They are unlikely to 
accept the high cost of the mandatory offer to achieve voting rights without 
market value due to the sunset clause providing that these rights lapse in the 
event of a transfer of underlying shares. It is not by chance that, in Italy, no cas-
es of mandatory offers occurred after tenured voting rights matured, and this 
trend is not likely to change.
Table B illustrates the implications of such interference. Given the owner-
ship structure, all shareholders holding greater than 30 percent of the voting 
rights in a company can reach a position of absolute centrality in all corporate 
decisions without incurring the obligation of mandatory bidding. Not even the 
creeping acquisition rule can hinder the power of controlling shareholders. 
Since additional voting rights require 24 months to mature, and while by defini-
tion creeping acquisition is intended to capture the rapid increases in voting 
rights (occurring in under 12 months), it is theoretically impossible for the 
shareholders of Group a), b) and c) of Table B to trigger the mandatory offer 
147. In this situation more than one shareholder is entitled of additional voting rights but, 
when some of them suddenly dissolve one of the loyal shareholders may see her voting power rise 
above the relevant threshold. The exemption requires that two conditions are met: the increase in the 
voting power was involuntarily and shareholder—who has voting rights above 30%—does not dis-
pose of voting shares above this same percentage. Insert citation here; see Art. 49(1), d-bis and c) of 
Consob Regulation, supra note 109; Mosca, supra note 142, 880.
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obligation solely by the attribution of increased voting rights, without share ac-
quisition. In addition, these shareholders tend to keep their holdings above the 
relevant takeover thresholds, thus limiting the alleged positive impact of tenured 
voting rights on the liquidity of the company’s shares.
A different result has been observed in France, where the state maintained 
the same degree of control due to the role of tenured voting rights but reduced 
its capital stakes.148 In Italy, on the contrary, “Registered shareholders” are al-
most always private owners or entities. Moreover, in France takeover regulation 
provided, a special derogation from the mandatory offer obligation for the four 
years following the Loi Florange, applicable when the maturity of the addition-
al voting rights was offset by a reduction in the stake owned. In Italy, which did 
not have a similar provision, a comparable dilution was not observed.
The selective effect determined by takeover regulation is clear and depends 
on the ownership structure of the individual company. Shareholders with less 
than 30 percent of the voting rights would bear the cost of the mandatory offer 
if, by maturing their time-phased voting rights, they exceed this relevant per-
centage. In that case, they will not pressure the board of directors to consider 
and propose the adoption of tenured voting rights.
It could be argued that a different fine tuning of takeover bid thresholds 
would be more appropriate. One possible course of action entails set-
ting variable thresholds depending on whether the triggering event involves the 
purchase of shares or the maturity of tenured voting rights. Italy is currently 
using this solution, where a 25 percent threshold is applied in the majority of 
cases if exceeded because of acquisition, while a 30 percent threshold applies to 
tenured voting. But, as the empirical evidence has shown, 30 percent—despite 
being the most widespread percentage assumed in several Member States to in-
dicate corporate control—is not the most suitable threshold in cases of tenured 
voting rights. A higher threshold would capture situations in which the control-
ling shareholder, upon the award of bonus voting rights, achieves a sharp in-
crease in voting power.
As shown in Table B, thirty-two shareholders achieved the majority neces-
sary to dominate (or nearly dominate) in their general shareholders’ meetings 
without incurring the mandatory offer obligation.149 By contrast, the thirty per-
cent threshold discourages the shareholders with shares below this level from 
pushing for the adoption of this loyalty-enhancing mechanism. The final result 
is contrary to the original expectation. For tenured voting rights to benefit cor-
porate governance, they must offer a genuine incentive for relevant (although 
non-controlling) shareholders to increase their engagement and participation in 
the company’s life. They are instead those more affected by the mandatory offer 
obligation, and thus not interested in a reward for their loyalty, in terms of vot-
ing power.
148. Becht et al., supra note 34, at 27.
149. In Table B there are eighteen cases of ‘Absolute dominance’, twelve of ‘Dominance’,
and one of ‘Near dominance’ out of thirty-eight observations.
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The proposal of raising the takeover threshold for tenured voting rights de-
serves to be considered at the European level as Member States strive for more 
uniformity in their corporate law. It serves a valid political purpose—to limit
controlling shareholders from exploiting tenured voting to gain indisputable and 
absolute power over all corporate decisions. This option would credibly revital-
ize corporate democracy, specifically addressing the fact that, in highly concen-
trated ownership structure, tenured voting can completely mute the voice of mi-
nority shareholders. At the same time, when the ownership structure is less 
concentrated, a more balanced system of exemptions from the mandatory offer 
obligation (or simply a higher takeover threshold) would not inhibit the adop-
tion of tenured voting to encourage shareholders’ active involvement in the 
company’s life.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Unlike in politics, where the one person, one vote principle dominates,150
corporate law has offered several solutions for shaping shareholders’ voting 
rights according to their preferences, and the question of the persistent primacy 
of the one share, one vote principle has shifted to theoretical debate.151 Compa-
nies have been allowed, with varying degrees of freedom in each jurisdiction, to 
select and shape their optimal shareholder base within the boundaries of corpo-
rate law’s default rules.152
In the age of empowered shareholders, “shareholder cultivation”153 has 
found fertile ground. The pressure toward short-termism, highly debated over 
the last decade, has prompted companies to view crafting an optimal sharehold-
er base as a strategic decision. In this scenario, tenured voting rights, although 
unanimously listed in the literature on CEMs, have been considered a more 
flexible and suitable tool than dual-class shares to rewrite the terms and dynam-
ics of shareholders’ engagement and ownership. By rewarding long term share-
holders, tenured voting rights empower insiders to a lesser extent than dual-
class stocks and treat all shareholders equally by granting all the same option to 
mature additional voting rights.
Tenured voting rights are likely to be at the heart of the discussion on voting 
rights for a long time. Not only are they a default rule in France, and can be 
voluntarily adopted by Italian companies (and soon by Belgian companies), but 
recently, in the US, a group of technology entrepreneurs requested regulatory 
approval to set up the Long-Term Stock Exchange which would only list shares 
150. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 9, at 446, 456.
151. Id. at 472.
152. Rock, supra note 9, at 903.
153. Belinfanti supra note 9, at 872.
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with tenured voting.154 However, the empirical evidence has shown that in Con-
tinental Europe the importance of tenured voting as a necessary tool to improve 
the long-term position of shareholders should not be overestimated, particularly 
in companies with pre-existing long-term (controlling) shareholders. In Italy 
“long-termism” was the most-used slogan cited by the board of directors to pro-
pose the adoption of tenured voting, but a close examination reveals they actual-
ly pursued the goal of empowering the controlling shareholders, placing them in 
a position to dominate the general shareholder meetings. The US has experi-
enced a similar result—although in a smaller sample of companies with time-
phased voting rights— where a group of long-term shareholders  can guarantee 
the outcome of any shareholder vote, due to factors that multiply voting rights 
by more than the double vote allowed by the Member States.155
Assessing the advantages and drawbacks of tenured voting rights is com-
plex. They occupy an intermediate step on a spectrum between one share, one 
vote and dual-vote class stock. Likewise, on both sides of the Atlantic, tenured 
voting has shown to be particularly suitable and appealing to controlled firms, 
or by other public firms with relatively concentrated ownership.156 There is no 
evidence, though, on the use of this loyalty-enhancing mechanism by widely 
held companies.
Tenured voting also represents a response to regulatory competition within 
Member States. In this respect, however, Europe is a special environment, 
where regulation—specifically, takeover regulation—strongly influences com-
panies and shareholders to efficiently bargain in shaping the most appropriate 
structure of their voting power. Deviations from the one share, one vote princi-
ple at the level of single Member States may require a tailor-made adaptation of 
the law, touching sensible areas for the integrity of the European market and 
bearing the risk of excessive fragmentation across Europe.
154. Alexander Osipovich & Dennis K. Berman, New Stock Exchange to Take Long-Term 
View, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2017) https://gcalhoun.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/17-10-16-wsj-
new-stock-exchange-to-take-long-term-view.pdf.
155. See Dallas & Barry, supra note 8, at 635.
156. See id. at 645.
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DEFINITIONS
No Progressive order identifying companies in Table A.
Companies
Thirty-nine companies included in the sample are listed 
in descending order according to capitalization as of 
June 29, 2018 (each had tenured voting as of June 
2018). 
Proposal
The directors’ proposal, submitted before the general 
meeting of shareholders; when this document was not 
available, data were gathered from the minutes of the 
general meetings, or from the IPO registration 
documents. In a few cases the report was not available 
[NA].
Main Statements 
Main statement of the directors’ proposal to explain 
why tenured voting supports the interest of the 
company. Beyond slight differences in wording, four 
main statements that focus on the alleged benefits of 
tenured voting rights were identified and summarized. 
Specifically: Statement A [A] (26 observations)—in 
this case, directors emphasize tenured voting rights 
aimed at “increasing the loyalty/long-termism of the 
shareholder base”; Statement B [B] (20 
observations)—underlines a more direct effect of 
tenured voting as the opportunity given to directors to 
‘enhance long-term strategies’; ‘Statement C’ [C] (9 
observations)—the most concealed one, it simply 
focuses on the ‘rewarding effect of tenured voting 
rights,’ and some companies add that such a reward is 
‘necessary to maintain the preeminence of long-term 
shareholders’; finally, ‘Statement D’ [D] (8 
observations)—suggests that tenured voting rights may 
‘increase loyalty of minority shareholders.’
Ind. Directors/Minority
The number of independent directors /and the number 
of directors appointed by minority shareholders. When 
this information on board composition is not contained 
in the pre-general meeting proposal prepared by 
directors, it was taken from the corporate governance 
report, or the remuneration report, or the minutes of the 
general meeting when the board was appointed. In a 
few cases, the information was not given [NG].
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Board Unanimity
The board’s support for the proposal on tenured rights. 
When unanimity of the board cannot be derived from 
the pre-general meeting report drawn up by directors, 
the information is inferred from the minutes of the 
general shareholders’ meeting, if it provides such 
evidence. In a few cases, the information was not given 
[NG].
General Meeting
Date of the shareholders’ general meeting that 
approved the introduction of tenured voting in the 
articles of association. [S] indicates that the decision 
was adopted when a facilitating quorum was 
applicable. [IPO] indicates that the company 
introduced the clause relating to tenured voting rights 
prior to listing.
Quorum
Percentage of shares represented at the shareholders’
general meeting (presence quorum)/and percentage of 
those voting in favor of the adoption of tenured voting 
rights. 
Multiplier Multiplying factor of tenured voting rights after 
maturity. In Italy, the maximum is 2.
Loyalty Maturity period, in Italy, should be set at not less than 24 months. 
Registration Date
Date of registration of the Registered Shareholder who 
applied to mature additional voting rights for all or a 
portion of her shares. [Pre-IPO] indicates that the 
company introduced the clause relating to tenured 
voting rights prior to listing.
Registered Shareholder
Shareholder who registered the largest holding. They 
are classified into four groups for each company, 
depending on the percentage of share ownership a)
>50%, b) > 45%, c) > 30%, d)
Registered Shares 
Registered shareholders may have registered, to mature 
tenured voting, all their shares or only some of them, 
sometimes at different times.
Stake Reduction
Dilution of the voting rights that occurred when, after 
registration, the first shareholder reduced part of the 
holding. 
Maturity Date Maturity date of the first portion of shares registered by the Registered Shareholder.
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Empowerment
The power distribution after maturity is provided on 
the Italian Financial Supervisory Authority (Consob) 
website, once the first shareholder has matured 
additional voting rights; this official source [OS] also 
considers the dilution effect resulting from the maturity 
of double voting gained by other shareholders 
registered and accounts for the very rare cases in which 
some shareholders renounced the maturation of 
additional voting rights. When maturity is still due, the 
source is either the directors’ pre-general meeting 
report, if it contains such information [D], or a forecast 
generated by calculating all the voting rights attributed 
to the first shareholder/the amount of the company’s 
voting rights [F] (in this case, the projection is made 
assuming that the total number of issued shares will not 
change, or, if they do, the benefit of additional voting 
rights is extended to them as provided by all 
companies’ articles of association).
Moreover, power was categorized as follows:
Absolute dominance
The result of tenured voting empowerment: the 
shareholder can impose her vote in all ordinary and 
extraordinary shareholders’ meetings.
Dominance
The result of tenured voting empowerment; when two 
condition are met: i) considering that the average 
participation in the general shareholders’ meeting in 
Italian companies is 70 percent, the Registered 
Shareholder is entitled to two-thirds of these voting 
rights; ii) considering the Presence Quorum in the 
general meeting that introduced the tenured voting in 
Table A, the registered shareholder is or will be 
entitled to two-thirds of these voting rights.
Near dominance
The result of tenured voting empowerment: the 
shareholder already possessing statutory control gets 
very close to the Dominance position.
Control
The result of tenured voting empowerment: thanks to 
tenured voting, the shareholder is entitled to more than 
30% of the voting rights.
Non-controlling 
shareholder
The result of tenured voting empowerment: the 
shareholder is entitled to less than 30% of the voting 
rights.
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Dilution Post-
Empowerment
Other relevant shareholders have registered who will 
mature additional voting rights after June 2018. It is 
unknown whether other non-relevant shareholders 
were also registered, as this information was not 
publicly available.
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TABLE A
39 COMPANIES INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
(ALL COMPANIES WITH TENURED VOTING IN JUNE 2018)
COMPANIES LISTED IN DESCENDING ORDER ACCORDING TO THEIR 
CAPITALIZATION ON JUNE 29, 2018


















2 Diasorin X [B] 4/0 X 28.04.2016 82,41/73,36 Double voting
2
Years 07.07.2016





4 Hera X [A][B] 11/3 X 28.04.2015 74,68/81,60 Double voting
2
Years 01.06.2015









X [A][B] 3/0 X 20.04.2018 88,20/85,82 Double voting
2
Years 02.07.2018
7 I.M.A. X [A] 3/0 NG 21.04.2017 79,06/76,19 Double voting
2
Years 01.06.2017
8 Iren X [B][D] 9/2 X 09.05.2016 72,72/79,44 Double voting
2
Years 01.06.2016
9 Reply X [C][D] 3/0 X 13.09.2017 75,42/77,53 Double voting
2
Years 31.10.2017









11 Datalogic X [A] 2/0 NG 04.05.2017 83,91/81,41 Double voting
2
Years 27.07.2017







X [B][D] 5/1 X 18.02.2015 76,14/87,62 Double voting
2
Years 31.03.2015





15 Biesse X [A] 2/0 NG 24.04.2018 80,02/64,57 Double voting
2
Years NA

























X [A][C] 4/0 NG 18.07.2016 78,43/97,25 Double voting
2
Years 29.12.2016
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22 Nice X [A][C] 3/0 X 24.04.2015 81,39/99,59 Double voting
2
Years 02.12.2015





24 Cofide X [B][C][D] 6/0 X 27.04.2015 58,17/94,23 Double voting
2
Years 01.06.2015
25 Carraro X [B][C] 3/0 X 15.04.2016 65,30/100 Double voting
2
Years 29.04.2016
26 Sabaf X [A][B][D] 5/1 X 28.04.2016 56,82/90,59 Double voting
2
Years 01.08.2016

































X [A] 5/0 NG 13.06.2016 63,05/99,99 Double voting
2
Years 02.01.2017
33 Fidia X [A] 3/0 NG 28.04.2017 56,29/100 Double voting
2
Years 09.04.2018































X [A] 2/NG X 05.05.2015 37,44/100 Double voting
2
Years 13.07.2015
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a) Tenured voting matured by first registered shareholder After maturity date
1 Davide Campari >50 All No Yes 09.04.2017 Dominance [OS] Yes
3 Amplifon >50 All Yes Yes 02.04.2017 Dominance [OS] No

























24 Cofide >50 All No Yes 01.06.2017 Dominance [OS] No
27 Astaldi >50 Some No Yes 01.03.2017 Absolute dominance [F] No










Maturity date still due
5 De’ Longhi >50 All No Yes 21.04.2019 Absolute dominance [F] Yes
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15 Biesse >50 All No No 18.05.2020 Absolute dominance [F] No
19 Cairo Communication >50 All No No 29.12.2018
Absolute 
dominance [F] No















34 Class Editori >50 All No Yes 27.10.2018 Dominance [F] Yes
b) Tenured voting matured by first registered shareholder After maturity date
20 Saes Getters >45 All Yes No 09.04.2018 Dominance [F] Yes
25 Carraro >45 Some Yes Yes 29.04.2018 Dominance [F] No
28 Intek Group >45 All No Yes 15.06.2018 Dominance [OS] No
31 Exprivia >45 Some No No 01.03.2018 Dominance [OS] No
Maturity date still due





32 Centrale del Latte d’Italia >45 All No No 02.01.2019
Dominance 
[F] No
36 Ternienergia >45 All No Yes NA Dominance [F] No
c) Tenured voting matured by first registered shareholder  After maturity date






Maturity date still due
2 Diasorin >30 All No No 07.07.2018 Dominance [D] Yes
18 Gruppo Mutuionline >30 Some No No 29.08.2020 Control [F] No
35 Lventure Group >30 Some No No 03.08.2019 Dominance [F] No
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d) Tenured voting matured by first registered shareholder  After the maturity date


















39 Gruppo Waste Italia Some No No 13.07.2017 Control [OS] No
Maturity date still due
26 Sabaf All Yes No 01.08.2018 Control [F] Yes
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